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RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: FEDERALISM,
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LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT POWER
StephanieHallBarclay*
ABSTRACT
Brewingtensionsbetweenstategovernmentsandthefederalgovernmenthave
reachedaboilingpointunmatchedsincethecivilrightsdebatesofthe1960s. Inlight
oftherapidexpansionoffederalpowercombinedwithcollidingviewsonvarious
policies, the cal for states rights has increasingly become a ralying cry for lawmakers
thathasgainedtractionwithgroupsonvaryingpointsalongthepoliticalspectrum,
aswelasafrequenttheoryemployedbytheSupremeCourt. Whilethesystem offed-
eralism createdbytheConstitutioncertainlyhasitsuniquebenefits, andwhileitistrue
thatthefederalgovernmentwasdelegatedlesspowerthanthestategovernments, a
states rights model of federalism relies on the following three assumptions that are
problematicfrom ahistoricperspective: (1) itwasthestateswhograntedthefederal
governmentcertainsovereignpowersandwhoretainultimatesovereignty;(2) there
isazero-sum balanceofpowerbetweenthesetwosovereigns, andanyreductionin
federalpowermustbeaccompaniedbyanenhancementofstatepowers;and(3) when
statesaregoverningwithintheirsphereofsovereignauthority, theirplenarypolice
powersareonlylimitedbyexplicitstateorfederalconstitutionalprovisions.
Throughnewhistoricalanalysisofratificationdebates, originalstateconstitutional
provisions, andantebelum caselaw, thisArticlechallengestheunderlyingassump-
tions of a states rights conception of federalism and instead ilustrates that the people
as a sovereign body separate and distinct from the stateswere viewed by both the
framersandstatesastheultimatesourceandresiduarylocationofsovereignpower.
Itwasthepeoplewhoformedbothstateandfederalgovernmentstoactasagentsfor
the people, exercising a bounded portion of the peoples sovereignty. As ultimate sov-
ereigns, thepeoplealsohavetheabilitytoreserveadditionalpowerstothemselves
withoutbeingrequiredtodelegatethosepowerstoeitherstateorfederalgovernments
inazero-sum shufflingofsovereignauthority. Finally, thisArticledemonstratesthat
theAmericanmodelofpopularsovereigntyismorethanmerelyaninterestingaca-
demicconcept. Certainsovereignpowerswereunderstoodtoremainwiththepeople
and have not been delegated to any governmentsuch as the power to arbitrarily
violatenaturalrights. Thismodeloffederalism wasunderstoodtoimposeadditional
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substantivelimitationsonbothfederalandstatepowersdatingbacktotheAmerican
Revolution. Viewedthroughthishistoriclens, federalism wasnotintendedmerelyas
ameansofprotectingtherightsofstates. Rather, theAmericanconceptionoffeder-
alism wasconceivedasameansofprotectingtherightsofthepeople, andthedivision
oflimitedpowersbetweenthefederalandstategovernmentsisusefulonlyinasmuch
asitisaccomplishingthatend. Underthismodel, theidealsoflimitedgovernmentand
strongprotectionsoffundamentalrightsarenotatoddswitheachother, butarerather
principlesthatcomplementeachotherinprovidingforthewelfareandsecurityofthe
nations ultimate sovereignthe people.
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INTRODUCTION
Brewingtensionsbetweenstategovernmentsandthefederalgovernmenthave
reachedaboilingpointunmatchedsincethecivilrightsdebatesofthe1960s.1 Inlight
oftherapidexpansionoffederalpowercombinedwithcollidingviewsonpolicies,
the call for states rights has increasingly become a rallying cry of lawmakers2 that
hasgainedtractionwithgroupsonvaryingpointsalongthepoliticalspectrum.3
1 See HumaKhan, States Battle with Federal Government on Health Care, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/health-care-battles-brew-medicaidvictim
-%20states/story?id=12207997;MicheleMcNeil, State-Federal Tensions Loom in Standards
Effort, ED. WEEK, Jan. 14, 2010, at 2627; Michael Ollove, State Resistance to Govt Goes
Back to USAs Beginnings, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2013/08/22/stateline-stateresistance-%20federal-government/2684921/;The
New Obamacare-Inspired States Rights Movement, GOVERNING MAG. (Nov. 2013), http://
www.governing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/col-new-states-rights-movement.html.
2 KirkJohnson, States Rights is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2010, atA1;see also TalKopan, Leading the Fight for States Rights, POLITICO (Oct. 26,
2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/kris-kobach-states-rights-98879.html.
3 FrankB. Cross& EmersonH. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism:An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73S.CAL.L.REV. 741, 745 (2000)
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One recent example of this movement is the states resistance to the federal Real
ID Actpassedin2005, whichimposedheightenedrequirementsonstatesintheis-
suance of drivers licenses.4 OpponentsoftheActarguedthatitviolatestheTenth
Amendmentbecausethefederalgovernmentislegislatinginanareatypicallyre-
servedtothestates.5 Since the Acts passage, over a dozen states have passed laws
prohibitingstateagenciesfrom complyingwiththisactwithintheirborders, and
additionalstateshavepassedlegislationdenouncingtheRealID Act.6
States rights advocates have also challenged federal gun control laws, such as
the National Firearms Act, as an invasion of states rights.7 Atthebeginningof2010,
sevenstatesjoinedwithMontanainalawsuitseekingtodeclarethislaw invalid.8
Additionaly, atleastthirty-sevenstateshavepassedlegislationtoinsomewayinhibit
federalgunlegislation, accordingtotheBradyCentertoPreventGunViolence.9
Increasingly, progressives have also relied on states rights arguments to justify
causessuchaslegalizingmarijuanaorpreventingtheDefenseofMarriageActfrom
infringing on states marriage laws.10 Eighteenstateshavelegalizedmarijuanafor
(While decisions in favor of states rights are often considered conservative, defense of states
rightsmaysometimeshavealiberaloutcome, andliberalconstitutionalscholarshavein-
creasingly embraced federalism for their own ends.); Robert J. Reinstein, Foreword:On the
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343, 35253 (2008)
(noting that states rights federalism arguments have been used to advance both conservative
andliberalagendas).
4 CHRISTOPHER WOLF, RECENT FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVACY AND INFORMATION
SECURITY 47374 (2009). I am indebted to Ryan Card for the sources related to the Real ID
Example.
5 AnthonyD. Romero, Op-Ed., OpposingView:Repeal Real ID, USA TODAY (Mar. 6,
2007), http:/web.archive.org/web/20070311050643/blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/03/post
_14.html.
6 Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States, ACLU, htp://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/;
see also Governor Signs Bill DefyingU.S. ID Law, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Montana) (Apr. 17,
2007),htp:/bilingsgazete.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/governor-signs-bil-defying
-u-s-id-law/article_1855fed8-6e4c-5be1-82de-7ffe2f953c0c.html;DeclanMcCulagh, Maine
Rejects Real ID Act, CNETNEWS (Maine) (Jan. 25, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2100-7348 _3
-6153532.html;DenaPotter, Real ID Mandate Resisted in Virginia, WASH.TIMES (Virginia)
(Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/03/some-legislators-oppose
-real-id-act-mandate/?page=all. Morestatesareintheprocessofenactingsuchlegislation.
7 See BarakY. Orbachetal., Arming States Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and
the BatteringRam Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2010);GlennHarlanReynolds&
DonB. Kates, The Second Amendment and States Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1737, 1749 (1995).
8 MatGouras, More States Join Fight with Feds over Guns, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9F28DHG0.htm.
9 TalKopan, States Seek to Nullify Obama Efforts, POLITICO (July27, 2013, 3:14 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/states-nullification-obama-94826.html.
10 KathleenM. Sullivan, From States Rights Blues to Blue States Rights: Federalism
After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2006);see, e.g., AlreenHussein,
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medicalpurposes, andWashingtonandColoradohavelegalizedmarijuanaevenfor
recreationalpurposes.11 Thesestatespassedsuchlawsinthefaceofclearlyconflicting
federal drug legislation. To a growing extent, the arguments in favor of states rights
havemovedbeyondtherealm ofpoliticalrhetoricandhavebeenacceptedbythe
SupremeCourt.12
Though many of the policy goals of states rights supporters certainly may be
laudable, the political and scholarly discussion justifying a conception of states rights
federalism generallyreliesonthreeassumptionsthatareproblematicfrom ahistoric
perspective. First, states rights advocates often argue that it was the states who granted
thefederalgovernmentcertainsovereignpowers, anditisthestateswhoretainulti-
mate sovereignty. As articulated by Justice Brennan, the States granted Congress
Comment, The GrowingDebate on Medical Marijuana:Federal Power vs. States Rights, 37
CAL. W. L. REV. 369 (2001);GeorgeF. Will, DOMA Infringes on States Rights, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-f-will-doma-infringes-on
-states-rights/2013/03/20/fa845348-90bb-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html;BarryFriedman,
Guns, Pot and States Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (May22, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/barryfriedman/guns-pot-and-states-right_b_3320982.html;IlyaSomin,
The DOMA Decision and Federalism, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June26, 2013, 11:29 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/26/the-doma-decision-and-federalism/.
11 State Marijuana Laws, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., http://tracking.tenthamendment
center.com/issues/state-marijuana-laws/#(clickonthegreenstatestoviewtheyearinwhich
eachlegalizedmedicalmarijuana;allofthegreenstateshavedonesobutDelaware, where
ithasbeenapprovedbypopularreferendum butstilawaitsofficialstateimplementation) (last
visitedOct. 23, 2014).
12 See U.S. TermLimits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (rejectingtheargument
thattheConstitutioncreatedadirectlinkbetweenthepeopleandthefederalgovernment, as
opposed to the states and federal government); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 55152,
56768 (1995) (striking down a federal gun statute that went beyond the few and defined
federal powers and interfered in the numerous and indefinite state powers); Lopez, 514
U.S. at580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguingthatthesamefederalgun statute upset[] the
federal balance to a degree that render[ed] it [] unconstitutional); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (emphasizingthebenefitsoffederalism andholdingthatdirectfederal
coercionofthestateswasunconstitutional);Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)
(describingneedtomaintainabalanceofpowerbetweenthestateandfederalgovernmentas
joint sovereigns). Supreme Court voting patterns in federalism cases from 1985 to 1997 were
studiedbyFrankCrossandEmersonTiler.Thefindingsindicatethatconservativejusticeswere
roughly one-and-a-half times more likely to use states rights to defeat a liberal plaintiffs
claims than a conservative plaintiffs claims, and roughly twice as likely to use states rights
tosupportaconservativeplaintiffs claim than a liberal plaintiffs claim. Conversely, liberal
justices were more than twice as likely to use states rights to defeat a conservative plaintiffs
claim than to defeat a liberal plaintiffs claim, and almost twice as likely to use states rights
tosupportaliberalplaintiffs position than to supportaconservativeplaintiffs position. Cross
& Tiller, supra note 3, at 76061, tbl. 2, tbl. 3. But see MichaelC. Dorf, Whose OxIs Being
Gored?When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21ST.JOHNSJ.LEGALCOMMENT. 497, 512
(2007) (arguingthatCrossandTillermayhaveoverstated the impact of justices ideology
by conflating issues of federal preemption doctrine with issues of states rights).
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specifically enumerated powers,13 andretainresiduarysovereigntyundertheCon-
stitution.14 Evidenceofthisbeliefisilustratedbythefactthatthirty-sevenstateshave
proposedlegislationorstateresolutionsassertingtheirsovereignty, andfourteenstates
hadpassedsuchlegislationasof2010.15 Manyoftheseresolutionspurporttoremind
thefederalgovernmentthatithasderiveditsdelegatedpowersfrom thestates, and
each State to itself has reserved the residuary mass of right to their own self-
government.16 For example, Alaskas sovereignty resolution states that the Alaska
StateLegislatureherebyclaimssovereigntyfor the state undertheTenthAmendment
totheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesoverall powers nototherwiseenumeratedand
granted to the federal government by the Constitution of the United States.17 Under
theauspicesoftheTenthAmendment, manyotherstates, suchasArizona, havesought
to remind the federal government that it should act as an agent of the states: [w]hereas,
thescopeofpowerdefinedbytheTenthAmendmentmeansthatthefederalgovern-
mentwascreatedbythestatesspecifically to be an agent of the states.18
13 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 45758 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
14 Forexample, inNewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), andPrintzv. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court reaffirmed the residuary and inviolable sovereignty of
thestates, anddeterminedthattheycouldnot be commandeered into enforcing federal laws
orregulations. 521 U.S. 898, 919 (quotingTHE FEDERALIST No. 39, at245 (JamesMadison)).
15 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, NorthDakota, Okla-
homa, SouthCarolina, SouthDakota, Tennessee, Utah, andWyomingpassedsuchresolutions.
See EdHornick, Tenther Movement Aims to Put Power Back in States Hands, CNN (Feb. 10,
2010,8:25AM)htp:/www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/10/tenth.amendment.movement/;see
also Orbachetal., supra note7, at1194, n.183 (citingS.J.R. 27, 2010 Leg. (Ala. 2010) (intro-
ducedonJanuary14, 2010, signedintolawonJanuary22, 2010);H.J.R. 27, 26thLeg. (Alaska
2009) (introduced on Mar. 19, 2009, filed without the Governors signature on August5, 2009);
H.C.R. 2001, 49thLeg. (Ariz. 2010) (introducedonJanuary11, 2010, filedwiththeSecretary
ofStateonApr. 22, 2010);H.J.M. 4, 60thLeg. (Idaho2009) (introducedonMar. 4, 2009);
S.C.R. 1615, 2010 Leg. (Kans. 2010) (introducedonMar. 16, 2009, effectivedateisMar. 29,
2010);S.C.R. 2, 2009 Leg. (La. 2009) (introducedonApr. 27, 2009);L.R. 539, 101 Leg. (Neb.
2010) (introducedonMar. 30, 2010, adoptedonApr. 13, 2010);H.C.R. 3063, 2009 Leg. (N.D.
2009) (introducedonMar. 20, 2009);H.J.R. 1003, 52ndLeg. (Okla. 2009) (introducedon
February2, 2009, vetoedbytheGovernoronApr. 24, 2009);H.C.R. 1028, 52ndLeg. (Okla.
2009) (introduced on Apr. 29, 2009, filed with Secretary of State without Governors signature
onMay14, 2009);S.B. 424, 118 Leg. (S.C. 2010) (introducedonFebruary12, 2009, adopted
onMar. 9, 2010);H.C.R. 1013, 85thLeg. (S.D. 2009) (introducedonMar. 2, 2009);S.J.R 311,
106thLeg. (Tenn. 2009) (introducedonApr. 16, 2009);S.C.R. 3, 2010 Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah
2010) (introducedJanuary7, 2010, signedintolaw onMar. 26, 2010);H.J.R. 2, 60thLeg.
(Wyo. 2010) (introducedonFebruary9, 2010, signedintolaw onMar. 8, 2010)).
16 H.R. Con. Res. 6, 2009 Sess. (N.H. 2009), available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us
/legislation/2009/HCR0006.html.
17 MichaelBoldin, Palin Signs Alaska Sovereignty Resolution, TENTH AMENDMENTCTR.
(July13, 2009), http:/tenthamendmentcenter.com/2009/07/13/palin-signs-alaska-sovereignty
-resolution/#.0Db_IdWSo(emphasisadded).
18 H.R. Con. Res. 2024, 49thLeg., 1stReg. Sess. (Ariz., 2009), available at http://www
.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/1r/bills/hcr2024p.htm (emphasisadded).
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AlthoughbothpoliticiansandSupremeCourtjusticesalsodiscusstheprinciple
of popular sovereigntythat government derives its power from the People19the
statesareoftentreatedasproxiesforthepeople.20 Assuch, thepeopleareoftenre-
ferred to as the People of the State of a specific state, or the people of the several
states, andarethusgivennoseparateanddistinctsovereignimportanceunderthisfed-
eralism scheme.21 Thestatesarethereforetreatedastheultimateholdersofresiduary
sovereigntyunderthisview.22
The second assumption is that because the atom of sovereignty in our federal
system is split between the states and federal government,23 thereisazero-sum
balanceofpowerbetweenthesetwosovereigns, andanyreductioninfederalpower
mustbeaccompaniedbyanenhancementofstatepowers, orviceversa. TheSupreme
Courtarticulatedthisview inExparte Commonwealth of Virginia,24 whenitstated,
Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a correspond-
ingdiminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.25
19 WilsonR. Huhn, Constantly ApproximatingPopular Sovereignty:Seven Fundamental
Principles of Constitutional Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 291, 29395 (2010).
20 See KurtT. Lash, The Lost Original Meaningof the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 331, 35556 (2004).
21 See, e.g., 10th Amendment Resolution, TENTHAMENDMENTCTR., http:/tenthamendment
center.com/10th-amendment-resolution/(lastvisitedOct. 23, 2014).
22 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:THERISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 28284 (1988); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrectingthe Privileges
or Immunities Clause and Revisingthe Slaughter-HouseCases Without ExhumingLochner:
Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 910 (1996) (Put
another way, the claim that the people actually rule is a legal fictionuseful, instructive, par-
tiallytrue, butstillalegalfiction. Forthegovernorsandthegovernedaredifferent, andthe
powerthepeoplegivetothegovernorsmaybeusedtothedisadvantageofthepeople
themselves.); see also Huhn, supra note 19, at 33031 ([T]o speak of states rights is to
confuse a State with an individual.); Timothy Zick, Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHNS J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 541, 54142 (2007) (The states are treated now more like nations or
persons;theyhaveconstitutionalrightsto such thingsasautonomy, equality, and due
process.); Timothy Zick, Statehood as the NewPersonhood:The Discovery of Fundamental
States Rights, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 216 (2004).
23 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
24 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
25 Id. at346 (emphasisadded);see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (The
principleofsovereignimmunityasreflectedinourjurisprudencestrikestheproperbalance
between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 18182 (1992) ([T]he Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments . . . .); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 26667
(1879) ([W]hen the national government was formed, some of the attributes of State sover-
eigntywerepartially, andotherswholly, surrenderedandvestedintheUnitedStates. Overthe
subjectsthussurrenderedthesovereigntyoftheStatesceasedtoextend. Beforetheadoption
oftheConstitution, eachStatehadcompleteandexclusiveauthoritytoadministerbyitscourts
althelaw, civilandcriminal, whichexistedwithinitsborders. Itsjudicialpowerextendedover
everylegalquestionthatcouldarise. ButwhentheConstitutionwasadopted, aportionofthat
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Under this states rights model of federalism, increasing states rights, or states scope
ofsovereignauthority, isnecessarytolimitfederalpower.26
Thethirdassumptionisthatwhenstatesaregoverningwithintheirsphereof
sovereignauthority, theirplenarypolicepowersareonlylimitedbyexplicitstateor
federalconstitutionalprovisions.27 Whileanumberofscholarstoutthebenefitsof
statesbeingabletoexerciseadditionalpower,28 critics point to the fact that a states
judicialpowerbecamevestedinthenewgovernmentcreated, andso far as thus vested it was
withdrawn from the sovereignty of the State. (emphasis added)).
26 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 57172 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the
States would ensure that the States would serve as an effective counterpoise to the power
oftheFederalGovernment. . . . [B]yusurpingfunctionstraditionalyperformedbytheStates,
federaloverreachingundertheCommerceClauseunderminestheconstitutionallymandated
balanceofpowerbetweentheStatesandtheFederalGovernment, abalancedesignedtoprotect
our fundamental liberties.).
27 Chief Justice Rehnquist described the plenary police power held by states, as op-
posed to the federal government, as power that would authorize enactment of every type of
legislation. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (emphasis added); see also
RandyBarnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 475
(2004) ([T]he police power of the states . . . is notorious for being difficult to define and
limit. (citing JOHN W.BURGESS, 1 POLITICALSCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 213 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890) (I can find no satisfactory
definition of this phrase, police power, in the decisions of the Supreme Court itself.)); Walter
WheelerCook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 322 (1907) (No phrase
ismorefrequentlyusedandatthesametimelessunderstoodthantheonewhichformsthe
subject of the present discussion.); Collins Denny, Jr., The Growth and Development of the
Police Power of the State, 20 MICH. L. REV. 173, 173 (1921) (The police power of the state is
oneofthemostdifficultphasesofourlawtounderstand, anditisevenmoredifficulttodefine
it and to place it within any bounds.); Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional
Error: The Rehnquist Courts States Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections
of Individual Rights, 11 SETONHALLCONST.L.J. 259, 33334 (2001) (During the preCivil
Warera, onlyafewprovisionsoftheConstitutionrestrictedstateinterferencewithnational
rightsi.e., rightssecuredagainststateinfringementbytheConstitution. . . . [S]tateshadno
inherent duty to respect the national rights of U.S. citizens . . . .).
28 See, e.g., JennaBednar& William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Courts Unsteady
Path: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68S.CAL.L.REV.1447 (1995);Erwin
Chemerinsky, RehabilitatingFederalism, 92 MICH.L.REV. 1333 (1994);ErwinChemerinsky,
The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499 (1995);MichaelC. Dorf& CharlesF. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);Barry
Friedman, ValuingFederalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997);RobertP. Inman& DanielL.
Rubinfeld, MakingSense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:BalancingPolitical Partici-
pation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997);
JonathanR. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation:Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA.L.REV. 265 (1990);
MichaelW. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484 (1987);DeborahJonesMerritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988);BarryR. Weingast, The Economic Role
of Political Institutions:Market-PreservingFederalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
264 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:257
rightsmodeloffederalism, focusedonexpandingunlimitedpowersforstates, has
proventobedetrimentaltoournation29 and has been regularly deployed, even in
this modern era, to thwart full remedies for violations of constitutional rights and
individualliberties.30
Thus, under the conventional states rights model of federalism, Americans are
caughtinafalsedilemmainwhichtheymustchoosebetweeneitherbigfederalgov-
ernment, withitsattendantprotectionsofindividuallibertiesbutlackoflocalaccount-
ability, ortheplenarypowerofstates, whichactasastrongcheckonfederalpowers
butprovidelessprotectionforindividualrights.31 However, thethreeassumptionsthat
underpin this model of federalism not only have a tenuous pedigree, they aremore
importantlynot justified by an originalmeaningunderstandingoftheconstitutional
framework, northehistoricalcontextsurroundingthedraftingoftheConstitution.
Throughnew historicalanalysisofratificationdebates, stateconstitutionalprovi-
sions, andantebelum caselaw, thisArticlechallengestheassumptionsunderlyingthe
29 These types of states rights arguments were used by Southern states to justify the en-
forcementofslavery, andeventuallyprovidedtheimpetusfortheCivilWar. See AlfredL.
Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand upon the Constitution:Federal-State Relations in
Scottv. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 19398 (1990); see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
NO STATE SHALLABRIDGE:THEFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILLOFRIGHTS (1986).
30 AkhilReedAmar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALEL.J. 1425 (1987);see also
Huhn, supra note 19, at 32829 (During the antebellum period states rights became the
batlecryofnulifiersandsecessionistsinsupportofslavery. AftertheCivilWar, statesover-
eigntyremainedtheprincipalargumentinoppositiontotheprotectionofnewlyfreedslaves,
and states rights was the constant refrain of segregationists up to and throughout the Civil
RightsMovementofthe1950sand1960s. Inthelatenineteenthcentury, theseracistswere
joinedbyindustrialistsseekingimmunityfrom federallawsoutlawingabusivepracticessuch
asmonopolizationandchildlabor, andforfiftyyearstheSupremeCourtenthusiasticallyen-
forced their agenda under the banner of state sovereignty. Not until the mid-twentieth century
did the Roosevelt Court and the Warren Court recognize Congresss power to adopt laws pro-
tectingworkersandracialminorities. Historically, state sovereignty was used to diminish
the right of the American people to defend themselves from oppression.); Simmons, supra
note 27, at 373 (The states rights jurisprudence and judicial activism of the Rehnquist Court
poseadirectthreattotherolesofCongressand the courtsboth state and federalin securing
theprivilegesandimmunitiesofnationalcitizenship, aswellastheguaranteesofdueprocess
and equal protection.).
31 Somescholarshaveobservedthatstateshavenotalwaysusedtheirplenarypowerto
fulfilltheiroriginalmandateofprotectingindividualrights. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note29;
RussellL. Caplan, The History and Meaningof the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223,
265 (1983) (The states, receding from the front ranksasdefendersofindividualfreedom,
eventuallycametoberegardedasobstaclesto liberty.). But other scholars have noted ways
inwhichstateshavegrantedmoreindividuallibertiesthanaregrantedunderthefederal
Constitution. See, e.g., G. AlanTarr& MaryCornelinPorter, Gender Equality and Judicial
Federalism:The Role of State Appellate Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 919, 95354 tbl.A
(1982) (observingstatesthatwereeithermoderatelywilingorwilingtoextendprotectionfor
individualrightsbeyondthoserecognizedbytheBurgerCourt);MaryElenCusack, Comment,
Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 175 (1993).
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states rights federalism model and instead illustrates that the peopleas a sovereign
body separate and distinct from the stateswere viewed as the ultimate source and
residuarylocationofsovereignpower.32 Assuch, itisthepeoplewhoformedbothstate
andfederalgovernmentstoactasagentsforthepeople, exercisingaboundedportion
of the peoples sovereignty.33 Thepeoplealsohavetheabilitytoreserveadditional
powerstothemselvesandneednotberequiredtodelegatethosepowerstoeitherstate
orfederalgovernmentsinazero-sum shufflingofsovereignauthority. Finally, this
ArticledemonstratesthattheAmericanmodelofpopularsovereigntyismorethan
merelyaninterestingacademicconcept. Certainsovereignpowerswereunderstood
to remain with the people and have not been delegated to any governmentsuch as
thepowertoarbitrarilyviolatenaturalrights. Governmentactionsofthisnatureare
withoutauthorityandvoid.34 Assuch, thismodelofsovereigntywasunderstoodto
imposeadditionalsubstantivelimitations35 onbothfederalandstatepowersdating
backtotheAmericanRevolution.36
32 See infra PartI.
33 See infra PartI andPartII.
34 See infra PartIII.
35 A number of scholars recognize the framers conception of individuals retaining certain
rightswhenevertheyentercivilsociety, withtheserightsoperatingasbindinglimitsongovern-
mentpower, butthesescholarsgenerallybasethesesubstantiveprotectionsofrightsonsocial
contracttheoryingeneralfocusedonthefederalgovernment, ratherthanapopularsovereignty
conceptionoffederalism thatlimitsbothstateandfederalgovernments. See RandyE. Barnett,
Implementingthe Ninth Amendment, in THERIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:THEHISTORY
AND MEANINGOFTHENINTH AMENDMENT 1,7 (RandyE. Barneted., 1989);ThomasC. Grey,
The Original Understandingand the Unwritten Constitution, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT
UNION: SIX ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145, 16267 (Neil L. York ed., 1988); John
Kaminski,RestoringtheDeclaration of Independence:NaturalRightsand theNinthAmendment,
in THEBILL OF RIGHTS 141 (JohnKuklaed., 1987);SuzannaSherry, The Founders Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U.CHI.L.REV. 1127, 116167 (1987); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the FlagBurning
Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 107481 (1991); see also ThomasB.
McAffee, The Original Meaningof the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1266
n.198 (1990) (citingadditionalworksthattreatnaturalrightstheoryasakeytounderstanding
the Ninth Amendment). In contrast, other scholars argue that the historical evidence shows
that the other rights retained by the people are those which the framers of the proposed
Constitutionsoughttosecurebythegrantingofspecifiedandlimitedpowerstothenational
government. Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty:The Ninth
Amendments Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POLY 63 (1987);PhilipA. Hamburger, The
Constitutions Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 31517 (1989);
RichardS. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:Three
Objections and Responses, 82NW.U.L.REV. 226, 26973 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee, The
Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights Retained by the People, 16 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 267, 268 (1992);ArthurE. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights:
James Madison and the Founders Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and
State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 128789, 129798, 130103 (1989).
36 Some scholars believe that an additional revolution in federalism occurred with the
passageoftheThirteenthandFourteenthAmendments. Simmons, supra note27, at336;see
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From thishistoricperspective, federalism wasnotintendedmerelyasameansof
protectingtherightsofstates. Rather, theAmericanconceptionoffederalism wascon-
ceivedasameansofprotectingtherightsofthepeople, andthedivisionoflimited
powersbetweenthefederalandstategovernmentsisusefulonlyinasmuchasitis
accomplishingthatend. Underthismodel, theidealsoflimitedgovernmentandstrong
protectionsoffundamentalrightsarenotatoddswitheachother, butareratherprin-
ciplesthatcomplementeachotherinafederalism modelaimedatprovidingforthe
welfare and security of the nations ultimate sovereignthe people.
I. THE PEOPLE AS ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNS
One of the traditional arguments in favor of the states rights model of federalism
isthatitwasthestateswhoinheritedtheultimatesovereigntyofthenationatthefound-
ingofthenew Americanrepublic, anditwasthestateswhodelegatedsomeoftheir
sovereignauthoritytocreatethefederalgovernment.37 However, historicevidence
stronglysuggeststhattheframersbelieveditwasthepeoplewhoinheritedtheulti-
matesovereignpowerpreviouslywieldedbytheBritishParliament, andthoughthe
statesdidlosesomeoftheirsovereigntyuponthecreationofthefederalgovernment,
itwasthepeoplethatdivertedthesesovereignpowersfrom onetypeofgovernment
toanother.
A. The People Inherited Parliaments Ultimate Sovereignty
Gordon Wood describes the doctrine of sovereignty as the constitutional issue
dividingBritainand America in the yearssurroundingtheRevolutionaryWar.38
Indeed, the theory of sovereignty pervaded the arguments of the whole Revolution-
ary generation from the early1760suntiltheadoptionofthefederalConstitutionin
thelate1780s.39 The assumption that there could be but one final, indivisible, and
also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICAS UNFINISHED REVOLUTION , 18631877, at
25051 (1988); HAROLD M.HYMAN &WILLIAM M. WIECEK,EQUALJUSTICE UNDER LAW 387
(1982);JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (originalypublishedas: THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OFTHEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT), 160 (1969). When this revolution occurred, [t]he
FourteenthAmendmentdidnotcreatenewprivileges. Itcreatedanewmethodofprotecting
old and inadequately secured privileges. Curtis, supra note 22, at 2425; see also RichardL.
Aynes, Constrictingthe Lawof Freedom:Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and The
Slaughter-HouseCases, 70 CHI.KENT L. REV. 627, 628 n.6 (1994) (The legislative history
makes it clear that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to establish any
new substantiverights;rather, theyintendedittobeaprocedurethroughwhichtheycould
enforce existing substantive rights.).
37 See supra notes 1318 and accompanying text; see also Brophy, supra note 29, at 19398.
38 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 17761787, at 344
45 (1969).
39 Id. at345.
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incontestable supreme authority in every form of government, to which all other
authoritiesweresubordinate, waswidelyaccepted, andthuseverynew institution
orideahadtobereconciledwiththisassumption.40 However, thekeyquestionwas
where thisultimatepowerresided.41
InEngland, thequestionofwhereultimatesovereigntyresidedhadbeendecided
aftertheEnglishCivilWarofthe1640s, atwhichtimeitwasestablishedthatultimate
sovereigntyresidedinParliament.42 SirWilliam BlackstonedescribedParliamentas
the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside
somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.43 Blackstonealso
explained that the power and jurisdiction of parliament was so transcendent and
absolute, thatitcannotbeconfined. . . . Trueitis, thatwhattheparliamentdoth, no
authority upon Earth can undo.44
ThecolonistsunderstoodthisBritishview thatultimatesovereigntyresidedin
Parliament, butthecolonistsrejectedthismodelandchoseinsteadtoplacetheunlim-
itedsovereignpowerinheritedfrom ParliamentinthepeopleoftheUnitedStates.45
40 Id.;see also JAMES OTIS,THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
12 (1764) (an original supreme Sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable, earthly powermust
existinandpresideovereverysociety;from whosefinaldecisionstherecanbenoappeal
but directly to Heaven.).
41 WOOD, supra note38, at345.
42 Amar, supra note 30, at 143032 (Colonial leaders took up arms in 1776 not simply
because they found Parliaments actual policies during the 1760s and 1770s intolerable in
fact, but also becauseas a matter of principlethey could not accept the British idea that
Parliamenthadlegitimateauthoritytodoanythingitwantedtothecolonies. . . . manycolonial
leadersarguedthatvariousParliamentaryenactmentswerevoidbecausetheyviolatedhigher
principlesoftheBritishConstitutionreflectedinreveredtextslikeMagnaCharta, andin
fundamental unwritten and common law traditions.); see also Huhn, supra note 19, at 29394
(People of different societies may profoundly disagree in their understanding of where sov-
ereigntyresides. Overtimeandindifferentplacespeoplehaveheldwildlydivergentopinions
about the ultimate source of political power.). Foradditionaldiscussionofriseofpopular
sovereignty, see HENRY NOELBRAILSFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
(1961);JOSEPH FRANK, THE LEVELLERS (1955);PAULINE GREGG, FREE-BORN JOHN: A
BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN LILBURNE (1961);MORGAN, supra note 22, at 28284; Michael Kent
Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty:The Levellers and the American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 359, 37786 (1991); David N. Mayer, The English Radical WhigOrigins of
American Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 131, 20408 (1992) (discussing views of
RadicalWhigs).
43 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 16061 (Wayne
Morrisoned., 2001).
44 Id. at160. InavaguesensetheBritishpeoplebelievedthatsovereigntyresidedinthe
peopleaswell, buttheydifferedwiththeAmericansinthattheybelievedthatParliament
wastheabsoluteembodimentofthepeople, andthusnoactionsoftheParliamentcouldbe
contrarytothewillofthepeople. Amar, supra note30, at1436.
45 See WILLIPAUL ADAMS,THEFIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 1417, 63
(1980) (explaining that in the Revolutionary Era, popular sovereignty had emerged as the basic
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James Wilson acknowledged that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power
in England is lodged in the British Parliament, but Wilson criticized this frame of
government and explained that though Great Britain boasts . . . of the improvement
she has made in politics . . . it by no means goes far enough.46 Contrary to Englands
frameofgovernment, Wilsonasserted, alongwithcountlessotherAmericanfounders,
that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains
in the people.47
In asserting popular sovereignty, the colonists were not merely engaging in an in-
tellectual shift of a political conception.48 Rather, the Americans were fundamentaly
unsettlingthetraditionalunderstanding of how the people participated in their gov-
ernment.49 Thus, the American Revolution was not merely an overthrow of Englands
governmental authority; it was a revolution of the colonists very conceptions of law,
constitutionalism, and politics, which resulted in a radical redistribution of the
powers of society and a shattering of the categories of government that had domi-
nated Western thinking for centuries.50 As described by Wood, this shift gave co-
herenceandreality, evenalegalreality, tothehackneyedphrase, thesovereigntyof
the people.51
principle of legitimate government); WOOD, supra note 38, at 182 (It was axiomatic by 1776
that the only moral foundation of government is, the consent of the people.); Carlos E.
Gonzalez, Representational Structures Through Which We the People Ratify Constitutions:
The TroublingOriginal Understanding of the Constitutions Ratification Clauses, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2005) (During [the Revolutionary Era], Americans cleanly re-
jectedtheBritishnotionthatsovereigntyrestedinParliament, and, instead, firmlyembraced
the republican notion that sovereignty rests with the People.).
46 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 2 ELLIOTS DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 423 (2d. ed.
1891) [hereinafter2 ELLIOT].
47 Id. at432. Toprovidefurtherhistoricsupportofthistheory, JamesMadisonstatedthat
the people were in fact, the fountain of all power. WOOD, supra note38, at533. JamesOtis
stated that the supreme absolute power is originally andultimately inthepeople;andthey
neverdidinfactfreely, norcantheyrightfully makeanabsolute, unlimitedrenunciationofthis
divine right. OTIS, supra note 40. Mr. Maclaine of North Carolina stated that [t]here is no
peopleonearthsowellacquaintedwiththenatureofgovernmentasthepeopleofAmerica
generallyare. Weknownowthatitisagreeduponbymostwriters, andmenofjudgmentand
reflection, thatallpowerisinthepeople, and immediately derived from them. JONATHAN
ELLIOT, 4ELLIOTS DEBATES ON THE FEDERALCONSTITUTION 161 (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter
4 ELLIOT]. Similarly, Justice Iredell stated that the American government is founded on much
nobler principles than other countries like England. In contrast to other governments, in
America [t]he people are known with certainty to have originated [their government] them-
selves. Id. at 9. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina stated, [w]e have been taught here to
believethatallpowerofrightbelongstothepeople;thatitflowsimmediatelyfrom them . . . .
HowdifferentarethegovernmentsofEurope!Therethepeoplearetheservantsandsubjects
of their rulers. Id. at319.
48 WOOD, supra note38, at383.
49 Id.
50 Id. at383, 385.
51 Id. at383.
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Although the exact framework of the peoples sovereignty in America took years
tocrystalize,52 JusticeStoryarguedthatoneofthefirstsovereignactsoftheAmerican
peoplewastheDeclarationofIndependence.
[T]hedeclarationoftheindependenceofallthecolonies. . .
was a declaration by the representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled; by the delegates appointed by
the good people of the colonies, as in a prior declaration of rights
theywerecalled. Itwasnot anactdonebythestategovernments
thenorganized;norbypersonschosenbythem. Itwasemphati-
calytheactofthewhole people oftheUnitedColonies, bythe
instrumentalityoftheirrepresentatives, chosenforthatamong
otherpurposes. Itwasanactnot competent to the state govern-
ments, oranyofthem, asorganizedundertheircharters, toadopt.
Thosechartersneithercontemplatedthecase, norprovidedfor
it. Itwasanactoforiginal, inherent sovereignty by the people
themselves, resultingfrom theirrighttochangetheform ofgov-
ernment, andtoinstituteanew government, whenevernecessary
fortheirsafetyandhappiness.53
Onasimilarnote, oneMassachusettsrepresentativesaidthatthepeopleofAmerica
were a people who have fought, who have bled, and who have conquered; who,
underthesmilesofHeaven, haveestablishedtheirindependenceandsovereignty,
and have taken equal rank among the nations of the earth.54 Thus, onceAmericawon
the Revolutionary War and cast off the yoke of England, it was the people of the
nation, and not the states, who inherited the absolute sovereign[ty] of the nation.55
52 Id. at 34489, 354 (The problem of sovereignty was not solved by the Declaration of
Independence. Itcontinuedtobethemostimportanttheoreticalquestionofpoliticsthroughout
thefollowingdecade, theultimateabstractprincipletowhichnearlyallargumentswere
sooner or later reduced.); see also Amar, supra note 30, at 1446 (In relocating sovereignty
from thegovernmenttothePeople, therevolutionarygenerationinitiallyseemedtohavein
mindthePeopleofeachstate, andnotthePeopleoftheUnitedStatesasawhole. Thecolo-
niesunitedtodeclaretheirindependence, buttheir Declaration proclaimed them to be free
andindependentstatesindependent even of each other, save as they chose to concert their
action. Inshort, theywereunitedstates, notaunitarystate;theywerethirteenPeoples, not
(yet) one People.).
53 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 1 ELLIOTS DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 66 (2d. ed.
1996) (emphasisadded) [hereinafter1 ELLIOT]. Indeed, theveryDeclarationofIndependence
itself articulates that Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
54 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at121.
55 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at65;see also ThomasG. West, The Political Theory of the
Declaration of Independence, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT 95
(RonaldJ. Pestritto& ThomasG. Westeds., 2003).
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Anexaminationofearlystateconstitutionalprovisionsillustratesthatstategov-
ernmentsunderstoodsovereigntytooriginatefrom andresidewiththepeople.56 Inthe
decadefollowingtheDeclarationofIndependence, stategovernmentsinstitutednew
constitutions at the recommendation of Congress in order to form new governments
on a popular basis.57 AsnotedbyWood, itisunsurprisingthatintherevolutionary
atmosphere of America at the time, special elections were held in seven of the colo-
nies prior to the framing of new constitutions,58 whichdeclaredthatsovereignty
resided in the people. For example, South Carolinas Constitution stated that [a]ll
powerisoriginallyvestedinthepeople;andallfreegovernmentsarefoundedon
their authority.59 Marylands Constitution stated that all government of right origi-
nates from the people.60 The vesting provision in North Carolinas Declaration of
Rights stated that al political Power is vested in and derived from the People only.61
Virginias provision stated that al power is vested in, and consequently derived from
the people.62 Massachusetss Constitution described [a]l power [as] residing origi-
naly in the people.63
Anotherexampleisearlyconstitutionalprovisionswhichdeclaredthatonlythe
peoplepossessedthepowertochangethestructureoftheirgovernmenttomeettheir
56 Maryland, Massachusetts, NewJersey, NorthCarolina, Pennsylvania, SouthCarolina,
Vermont, andVirginiaallhadthesetypesofconstitutionalprovisions. See MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 676 (NeilH. Coganed. 1997) [hereinafterTHE
COMPLETE BILLOFRIGHTS];MASS.CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in THECOMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at677;N.J. CONST. of1776, preamble, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at678;NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, §1,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at678;PA. CONST. of1776, preamble,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at678;S.C. CONST. of1790, art. IX, §1,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at680;VT. CONST. of1777, preamble,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at680;VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS of1776, §2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at680.
57 BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW
101 (1931).
58 WOOD, supra note38, at332 n.49 (thenew electionswereheldinNew Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, NorthCarolina, andGeorgia). Thoughtheuseofcon-
stitutionalconventionswasnotformalizedatthispoint, andwilbediscussedingreaterlength
inPartII, itisworthnotingthatlaterstatesattemptedtoenacttheirnewconstitutionsthrough
constitutionalconventions. Id. at332.
59 S.C. CONST. of1790, art. IX, §1 (1790), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note56, at680.
60 MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note56, at676.
61 NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, §1, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note56, at678.
62 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, §2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note56, at680.
63 MASS. CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. V, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note56, at677.
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needs. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution stated that the people alone
haveanincontest[a]ble, unalienable, andindefeasiblerighttoinstitutegovernment;
andtoreform, alter, ortotallychangethesame, whentheirprotection, safety, pros-
perity and happiness require it.64 Pennsylvanias Constitution stated that the people
havearight, bycommonconsenttochange[thegovernment], andtakesuchmea-
sures as to them may appear necessary to promote their safety and happiness.65 This
powerisparalleltothatheldbyParliament, which, asBlackstoneexplained, wasthe
power to change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom, and of the
parliaments themselves.66
InavaguesensetheBritishpeoplehadbelievedthatsovereigntyresidedinthe
peopleaswel, buttheydifferedwiththeAmericansinthattheybelievedthatParlia-
mentwastheabsoluteembodimentofthepeople, andthusnoactionsofParliament
couldbecontrarytothewillofthepeople.67 Asdiscussedabove, Americansrejected
thisview ofsovereigntywhentheymadeadistinctionthatthepeople, andnotanother
form of government, inherited Parliaments sovereignty. Thus, the people of the United
States, andnotthestatesthemselvesorasproxiesofthepeople, assumedtheultimate
sovereignpowerofParliament, includingthepowertochangeandreform government.
B. The People, Not the States, Diverted Sovereign Powers to the Federal
Government, and Thus Retained Residuary Sovereign Powers
Whileitistruethatthestategovernmentsdidlosesomeoftheirsovereignpowers
to the federal government, contrary to the arguments of states rights advocates, it was
thepeoplethatdivertedthesesovereignpowersfrom oneform ofgovernmentto
another. Supporters of the states rights model of federalism often turn to the Tenth
Amendmentasauthorityforthisconventionalclaim: sincetheConstitutionreserves
undelegatedpowertothestates, theyarguethatthestateswerethesourceofthis
powertobeginwith. However, atextualaspectofthisamendmentthatisoftenover-
lookedisthatundelegated power is reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.68 ItisimportantthattheTenthAmendmentdesignatesnoclearactorthat
dividesandreservesthispower.69 As Justice Thomas correctly observed, [w]ith this
carefullastphrase, theAmendmentavoidstakinganypositiononthedivisionof
64 MASS. CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note56, at677 (emphasisadded).
65 PA. CONST. of1776, pmbl., reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
56, at678.
66 BLACKSTONE, supra note43, at160.
67 Amar, supra note30, at1435.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasisadded).
69 See Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, supra note27, at432 (notingthatthe
Tenth Amendment provides no explicit reference to the proper scope of state powers. It most
assuredlydoesnotsaythatthestateshaveallpowersnotdelegatedtothefederalgovernment.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment is expressly noncommittal on the scope of state powers . . . .).
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power between the state governments and the people of the States . . . .70 Thus, this
provisionisatleasttextuallyconsistentwiththetheorythatthepeopledelegated
powerstothefederalgovernment, andthenlefttheremainderofthepowertothe
states, ortothemselves.71 Toconfirm thetheorythatthepeople, andnotthestates,
delegatedtheirpowers, wemustlooktoothercontemporaneoussources.72
Likelythemostcompelinghistoricevidencethatthepeople, andnotstates, trans-
ferredcertainsovereignpowerstothefederalgovernmentisfoundthroughexamining
theprocedureusedtoratifythefederalConstitution. From earlyon, itwasunderstood
that since a federal constitution would be creating a new system of government, the
authority of [the] constitution depended on the mode of its adoption.73 JohnAdams,
inhisinfluentialThoughts on Government, voicedtheassumptionthattheConstitution
couldbedraftedandratifiedlegislatively.74
However, otherdelegatesexpressedconcernthatitwasimprudenttoallow a
group of sitting legislators to frame the very fundamental rules under which they
were operating.75 They viewed this conflict of interest as a violation of reason and
natural rights.76 Theyexpressedfurtherconcernthataconstitutiondraftedandratified
legislativelywouldpossessthesameauthorityasanyotherstatute, whichwouldallow
subsequentlegislaturestoalterorevenignoresuchaconstitution.77 ThomasJefferson
arguedthatforaconstitutiontobebinding, thevotersmustunderstandthattheywere
authorizingapermanentcharterofgovernment.78 James Madison shared Jeffersons
views, and he wrote to George Washington that to give a new system its proper valid-
ityandenergy, aratificationmustbeobtainedfrom thepeople, andnotmerelyfrom
the ordinary authority of the [l]egislatures.79
Thesolutionthatstateshadbeguntouseinthe1770sandearly1780swastheuse
ofconstitutionalconventions. Conventionshadbeenuseddatingbacktomedieval
Englishhistory, andhadevenbeenusedintheEnglishGloriousRevolutionof1688.80
70 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 ThelegislativehistorysurroundingthepassageoftheTenthAmendmentsuggeststhat
itwasintended, inlargepart, tobeadeclarationofpopularsovereignty. KurtT. Lash, The
Original Meaning of an Omission:The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and
Expressly Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1924 (2008).
72 Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, supra note 27, at 434 (While the
TenthAmendmentestablishesthatfederalpowersarelimitedtothosethatareenumerated, it
doesnotsaywhetheranyparticularpowerisinthehandsofthestatesorofthepeople. . . . To
answer that question we must look elsewhere.).
73 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 98 (1996).
74 Id. at97.
75 Id. at98.
76 WOOD, supra note38, at338.
77 RAKOVE, supra note73, at98.
78 Id. at99.
79 Id. at100.
80 WOOD, supra note 38, at 31011, 318.
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However, theEnglishviewedtheuseofconventionsasinferiorinlegalauthorityto
Parliament, becauseoftheabsenceoftheking, andtheythususedconventionsonly
asalastrecoursewhenthecountrywasinastateofrevolution.81
WhileAmericansoriginallymayhavesharedtheBritishview ofconventions,
Americanseventualycametoviewconstitutionalconventionsastheonlyvalidmeans
ofcreatinganew constitution, whereasthelegislatureafterwardwastheproperbody
tomakelawsinaccordancewiththatconstitution.82 Bycreatingaconventionwhere
its members were invested with powers to form a plan of government only, and not
to execute it after it is framed, political leaders were able to avoid the problem
presentwhenlegislaturescreatedlawsthatwouldlatergivethosesamelegislators
power.83 As Kurt Lash explained, it also came to be accepted that the people collec-
tivelyheldultimatelaw makingauthoritywhichtheyexercisedwhenmeetingin
special extra-governmental conventions,84 whichthereforegavetheauthorityofthe
Constitutionsomethingbeyondordinarylegislation. Inaway, theuseofconven-
tionsallowedAmericanstocivilizeandchannelrevolutionarychangesofgovernment
intopeacefulmeansthatcouldbeinvokedonanyoccasionatthepleasureofthe
people.85 As Mr. Wolcot of Connecticut stated, [n]ever before did a people in time
ofpeaceand tranquility, meettogetherbytheirrepresentatives, and, with calm
deliberation, frameforthemselvesasystem ofgovernment. Thisnobleattemptdoes
honor to our country.86
81 Id. at319.
82 Id. at342, 338.
83 Id. at338 (emphasisremoved);McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory,
and the Rights Retained by the People, supra note 35, at 275 n.19 (The key development
intheshiftfrom relianceonpopularlegislaturestoanenlargedview ofpopularsovereignty
wasthedevelopmentoftheinstitutionofthepopularconstitutionalconventionthatestablished
adocumentthatboundallbranchesofgovernment. . . . [T]hecentralAmericanideaofcon-
stitutionalism aslimitinggovernmentpowercouldnotfullyemergeuntilthepowerofthe
legislature was disassociated from the power of the people.); Thomas G. West, The Rule of
Law in theFederalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 150, 155 (CharlesA. Keslered., 1987).
84 KurtT. Lash, On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders View of Retained Rights,
60 STAN. L. REV. 969, 975 (2008);see also WOOD, supra note38, at337 (arguingthata
constitutional convention was in a special manner the epitome of the People); Gonzalez,
supra note 45, at 1384 (only specially elected, popular constituent conventions, and not
ordinarylegislatures, werethoughtofasanadequatemedium throughwhichthesovereign
People could sanction and ratify constitutional norms.).
85 WOOD, supra note38, at342 (notingthatconventions seemed to have legitimized
revolution); Amar, supra note30, at1435 n.41.
86 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at200. JamesWilsonmadeasimilarpointwhenhestated:
America now exhibits to the worlda gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary,
andadeliberatetransitionfromoneconstitutionofgovernmenttoanother.
Inotherpartsoftheworld, theideaofrevolutioningovernmentis, by
amournfulandanindissolubleassociation, connectedwiththeideaof
wars, andallthecalamitiesattendantonwars. Buthappyexperience
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Thus, afterthedelegatestothefederalconventionhadcompletedtheirdraftof
theConstitution, ratherthanaskingCongressorthestatelegislaturestoapprovethe
Constitution, theconventioncaledforratifyingconventionstobeheldineachstate.87
Section VII of the Constitution declares, The Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States, shalbesufficientfortheEstablishmentofthisConstitutionbetweentheStates
so ratifying the Same.88 This constitutional provision came as a result of the Framers
recognitionthatthedramaticnew form ofgovernmentneededtobesanctionedbythe
people,ratherthanmerelybythestates. AsMadisonexplained, therevolutionarynature
of the new system required popular ratification because the true difference . . . be-
tween a league or a treaty, and a [c]onstitution was the difference between a system
founded on the legislatures only, and one founded on the people.89
Thereweremultipledebatesatthenationalconventionwhichconfirmedthatstate
conventionswereviewedasequivalenttopopularratification.90 Virginias Governor
EdmundRandolphofferedtheVirginiaplan, which, inter alia, proposedthat:
amendmentswhichshallbeofferedtotheConfederation, bythe
Conventionoughtatapropertime, ortimes, aftertheapproba-
tionofCongresstobesubmitedtoanassemblyorassembliesof
Representatives, recommendedbytheseveralLegislaturestobe
expressly chosen by the people, toconsider& decidethereon.91
Madison agreed with Randolph and argued that it [was] indispensable that the new
Constitutionshouldberatifiedinthemostunexceptionableform, andby the supreme
authority of the people themselves.92
Somerepresentatives, suchasRogerShermanfrom Connecticut, arguedthat
popular ratification [was] unnecessary since [t]he articles of Confederation [already]
provid[ed]forchangesandalterationswiththeassentofCong[ress]andratification
of the State Legislatures93 ElbridgeGerryofMassachusettsalsodisfavoredpopular
teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different lightto consider
them onlyasprogressivestepsinimprovingtheknowledgeofgovern-
ment, andincreasingthehappinessofsocietyandmankind.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 46, at 43233.
87 Gonzalez, supra note45, at1398 n.55. Foranin-depth, historicaldiscussionofthe
stateratifyingconventions, seegenerallyFRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1901);THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE
OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Patrick
T. Conley& JohnP. Kaminskieds., 1988).
88 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
89 WOOD, supra note38, at533 (quotingJamesMadison).
90 Forathoroughanalysisoftheratificationdebates, seegeneralyGonzalez, supra note45.
91 Id. at1397 (emphasisadded).
92 Id. at1400 (emphasisadded).
93 Id.
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ratification because he argued that the people have the wildest ideas of Government
in the world.94 OlliverEllsworthofConnecticutworriedaboutthechaosofthese
popularconventions, andexplainedthathe:
wishedalsotheplanoftheConventiontogoforthasanamend-
menttothearticlesofConfederation, sinceunderthisideathe
authorityoftheLegislaturescouldratifyit. . . . Iftheplangoes
forthtothepeopleforratificationseveralsucceedingConventions
withinthestateswouldbeunavoidable. . . . [Conventions]were
betterfittedtopulldownthantobuildupConstitutions.95
It is teling that while opponents of Randolphs proposal disagreed on the necessity of
allowing for popular sovereignty in special conventions, they did equate Randolphs
proposal to popular ratification, even though state legislatures would recommend
theseassemblies.96
MadisonconcludedtheJuly23 debateontheratifyingprovisionandarguedthat
the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded
onthepeople, tobethetruedifferencebetweenaleagueortreaty, andaConstitution.
[A] constitution established by the people themselves, Madison explained, would be
superior to a mere treaty, founded on the Legislatures only.97 After Madisons speech,
the convention approved the popular ratification provision by a vote of nine states
infavorandonlyonestateopposed.98 Insum, asonecommentatornoted, theevidence
94 Id. at1401.
95 Id. at1406.
96 Id. at1400.
97 Id. at1416. ChiefJusticeMarshallexpressedalmostidenticalsentimentstoMadison
regardingwhytheConstitutionneededtoberatifiedbythepeopleinconventions, incontrast
totheArticlesofConfederationrequiringonlyratificationbythestatelegislatures. Marshall
explained that while the sovereign consent of the states alone was sufficient for the league
createdundertheArticlesofConfederation:
when, in order to form a more perfect union, it was deemed necessary
tochangethisalliance[theArticlesofConfederation]intoaneffective
government, possessinggreatandsovereignpowers, andactingdirectly
onthepeople, thenecessityofreferringit to the people, andofderiving
its powers directly from them, wasfeltandacknowledgedbyall. The
governmentoftheUnion, then. . . is, emphatically, andtruly, agov-
ernmentofthepeople. Inform andinsubstanceitemanatesfrom them.
Itspowersaregrantedbythem, andaretobeexerciseddirectlyonthem,
andfortheirbenefit.
McCulloughv. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) (emphasisadded). Thus,
MarshallrejectedtheargumentmadebythecounselforthestateofMaryland, whoargued
that the Constitution was the act of sovereign and independent states . . . who alone are truly
sovereign. Id. at402.
98 Gonzalez, supra note 45, at 141718. Thoughthefederalconventiondiddebatethis
276 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:257
thattheframersoftheConstitutionviewedArticleVII assubmitingtheConstitution
to the consent of the people is overwhelming. In the arguments the delegates made,
thewaytheyframedthosearguments, andtheargumentstheychosenottomake, the
delegatesmanifestedastrongconsensusonunderlyingpremises. Ratificationbyex-
traordinaryassembliesorconventions, butnotordinarylegislatures, wasthoughtto
equate with ratification by the People.99
Thereisalsoampleevidencethatthestateratificationconventionsthemselves
understoodthattheywereratifyingtheConstitutionasspecialrepresentativesofthe
people, andnotthestates. Forexample, afterreceivingtheConstitutionfrom the
nationalconvention, theCongressissuedtoallstatelegislaturesaunanimousreso-
lution that the Constitution with this resolution be transmitted to the several legisla-
tures, inordertobesubmittedtoaconventionofdelegates, chosenineachstateby
thepeople thereof.100
Further, intheratificationdocumentsthatthestatedelegationsreportedbackto
Congress, eachofthestatesexpressedanunderstandingthattheconventionhadmet
anddeliberatedonbehalfofthepeople, notthestateitself. Delawarestarteditsrati-
fication letter with the statement, We, the deputies of the people of the Delaware state,
in Convention met.101 Pennsylvania similarly described the convention as we, the
delegates of the people, and explained that this convention was in the name and
by the authority of the same people.102 InNewJersey, thestatelegislaturehadevenen-
acted legislation to authorize the people of this state to meet in convention, deliberate
upon, agree to, and ratify, the Constitution.103 Massachusetss ratification report ex-
plained that the convention [does], in the name and in behalf of the people . . . assent
to and ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America.104 TheGeorgia
delegates described themselves as the delegates of the people and explained that in
virtue of the powers and authority to [them] given by the people they ratified the
Constitution.105 South Carolina described the convention as the Convention of the
people.106 New Hampshire expressed gratitude to the Supreme Ruler of the universe
for the opportunity that the people of the United States had to deliberately and
issueonefinaltimebeforefinalizingtheratificationprovision, thedelegatesvotedagainon
theprovisiononSeptember10, 1787, andgaveunanimousapprovaltotheprovision. Id. at
1418, 1424.
99 Id. at1425.
100 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at320 (emphasisadded);see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 403 (noting that the Constitution was reported to the then existing Congress of
the United States, with a request that it might be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the people thereof).
101 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at319.
102 Id.
103 Id. at320.
104 Id. at322.
105 Id. at324.
106 Id. at325.
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peaceably enter into a new and solemn compact with each other, by assenting to and
ratifying a new Constitution.107 North Carolinas report explained that the Conven-
tion had met in behalf of the freemen, citizens, and inhabitants of the state.108 And
Connecticut, Virginia, and Rhode Islands ratification reports al described the mem-
bers of the convention as the delegates of the people.109
Moreover, statementsbydelegatesmadeduringthedebatesatthestateconven-
tionsclearlyillustratethatthedelegatesunderstoodthesignificanceoftheirspecial
role as direct representatives of the people. Pendleton of Virginia pointed out that the
people, byus, arepeaceablyassembled, tocontemplate, inthecalm lightsofmildphi-
losophy, whatgovernmentisbestcalculatedtopromotetheirhappinessandsecure
their liberty.110 Governor Huntington of Connecticut explained that [n]ever before did
apeople, intimeofpeaceandtranquility, meettogetherby their representatives, and,
withcalm deliberation, frame for themselves a system of government.111 Melancton
Smith of New York said in this convention, the representative ought to understand and
governhisconductbythetrueinterestofthepeople.112 JamesWilsonofPennsylvania
explained that the people maychangetheconstitutionswheneverandhoweverthey
please and that the convention at this moment, speak[s] and deliberate[s] under
[the peoples] immediate and benign influence.113 Further, Wilsonexpressedpride
that this convention exhibits to the world the peoples ability to gently and peace-
ably transition from one constitution of government to another.114 GeorgeMasonof
Virginia expressed that this Convention, appointed by the people was a great and
important occasion, for securing . . . the happiness and liberty of the people . . . .115
EdmundArchibaldMaclaineofNorthCarolinaexplainedthattheConstitutionhad
been submitted by the legislatures to the people;sothatwhenitisadopted, itisthe
actofthepeople.116 Theseareonlyafew examplesofthestatementsbydelegates
illustratingtheirunderstandingthattheyrepresentedthepeople, andnotthestates,
inchoosingtoauthorizeandratifytheConstitution.
Thestatementsmadebydelegatesatstateconventionsalsoillustratetheirunder-
standingthatthoughthestateswerelosingsomeoftheirsovereignpower, itwasthe
people, asthesourceofallpower, whowereshiftingsomeaspectsofpowerfrom one
form of government to another. James Wilson from Pennsylvania observed that [i]n
107 Id. at326.
108 Id. at333.
109 Id. at321, 327, 334.
110 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 293 (2d. ed.
1996) [hereinafter3 ELLIOT](emphasisadded).
111 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at200 (emphasisadded).
112 Id. at272 (emphasisadded).
113 Id. at432 (emphasisadded).
114 Id. at 43233.
115 3 ELLIOT, supra note110, at3 (emphasisadded).
116 4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at16 (emphasisadded).
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thisConstitution, all authority is derived from the people, and that this new form
of government receive[d] its political existence from their authority.117 Further,
the power the people delegated for this national government was only a part of their
originalpower. . . . Theyneverpartwiththewhole;andtheyretaintherightofre-
calling what they part with.118 Inresponsetoconcernsofhisfellow delegatesthat
stateswerelosingportionsoftheirsovereignty, Wilsonopenlyadmittedtohisstate
convention that state sovereigntieswill, underthissystem, bedisrobedofpartoftheir
power.119 ButWilsonarguedthatsince
sovereigntyresidesinthepeople. . . andthepeoplearethesource
ofauthority, theconsequenceis, thatthey may takefrom the
subordinategovernmentspowerswithwhichtheyhavehitherto
trustedthem, and place those powers in the general government,
ifitisthoughtthattheretheywillbeproductiveofmoregood.
Theycandistributeoneportionofpowertothemorecontracted
circle, calledstategovernments;theycanalsofurnishanotherpro-
portiontothegovernmentoftheUnitedStates. Whowillunder-
taketosay, asastateofficer, thatthepeoplemaynotgivetothe
generalgovernmentwhatpowers, andforwhatpurposes, they
please? . . . . The[powerofthe]generalgovernment. . . [could
not]bedrawnfrom anyothersource, orvestedinanyotherauthor-
ity, thanthatofthepeopleatlarge;andI considerthisauthority
astherockonwhichthisstructurewillstand.120
Edmund Pendleton of Virginia echoed Wilsons thoughts when, in response to con-
cerns about why the Constitution said We the People, instead of We the States,
Pendleton asked the rhetorical questions: [W]ho but the people can delegate powers?
Whobutthepeoplehavearighttoform government? . . . Whathavethestategov-
ernments to do with it?121 JohnMarshallofVirginiasimilarlystatedthatbothstate
and federal government[s] derived [their] powers from the people, and each was to
act according to the powers given it.122 Maclaine of North Carolina asserted, The
people, sir, aretheonlyproperauthoritytoform agovernment. They, sir, haveformed
theirstategovernments, andcanalterthem atpleasure. Theirtranscendentpoweris
competenttoform thisoranyothergovernmentwhichtheythinkpromotiveoftheir
happiness.123 Thefactthatthesequoteswerespokenbystaterepresentativestoleaders
117 2 ELLIOT, supra note 46, at 43435.
118 Id. at437.
119 Id. at443 (emphasisomitted).
120 Id. at 44344 (emphasis added).
121 3 ELLIOT, supra note110, at37.
122 Id. at419.
123 4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at161.
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atastateconventionispowerfulevidencethatthestatesthemselveswereawarethat
thesovereignpowerforthenationalgovernmentwasbeingdelegatedbythepeople,
andnotthestates.
Inadditiontotheratificationdebates, amendmentsproposedbyvariousstatesafter
theirratificationconventionspresentevidencethateventhestatesviewedthepeople
astheprimaryactorswhoweredivertingcertainsovereignpowersfrom stategovern-
ment to federal government. For example, one of New Yorks proposed amendment
states that every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said Constitution
clearlydelegatedtotheCongressoftheUnitedStates, orthedepartmentsofthe
Governmentthereof, remains to the People of the several States, ortotheirrespective
StateGovernmentsto whom they may have granted the same.124 Rhode Islands
ratificationreport, whichitissuedaftertheConstitutionhadalreadybeenratifiedby
therequisitenumberofstates, expressedthisidenticalprinciple.125 Thislanguageis
interestingbecauseitclearlyseparatesthepowerofthepeoplefrom therightsofthe
states. Italsomakesclearthatitisthepeoplewhohavedelegatedpowertoboththe
federalandstategovernments. Virginia, NorthCarolina, andRhodeIslandaloffered
an amendment which stated that all power is naturally vested in, and consequently
derivedfrom, thepeople;thatmagistrates, therefore, aretheirtrusteesandagents, and
at all times amenable to them.126 Notonlydoesthisproposedamendmentconfirm
theideaofthepeopleassovereigns, itilustratesthatthedelegatesrecognizedthatthe
powerforthenew nationalgovernmentoriginatedinthepeople, justasthepower
from thestatesdid.
A finalevidencethatthepeopleweretheactorsinthedelegationofpowerto
thefederalgovernmentcomesfrom earlyantebellum Courtdecisions. InMartin v.
Hunters Lessee,127 the Supreme Court stated that [t]he constitution of the United
Stateswasordainedandestablished, notbythestatesintheirsovereigncapacities,
but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by the people of the
United States.128 InWare v. Hylton,129 theCourtstatedinreferencetothepeoplethat
by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established . . . .130 In
Chisolm v. Georgia,131 the Court explained that the people, in their collective and na-
124 AmendmentsProposedbytheNew YorkConvention(July26, 1788), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 2122 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
125 Powers not delegated remain to the people of the several states, or their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same. 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at334.
126 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at334;3 ELLIOT, supra note110, at657;4 ELLIOT, supra
note47, at243.
127 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
128 Id. at324.
129 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
130 Id. at236.
131 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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tional capacity, established the present Constitution.132 And, probablythemostfamous
SupremeCourtcasetoilustratethisprinciplewasMcCulloch v. Maryland.133 AsChief
Justice Marshal described it, The people oftheUnitedStateshaveseenfittodivide
sovereignty, andtoestablishacomplexsystem. Theyhaveconferredcertainpowers
on the State Governments, and certain other powers on the National Government.134
Thefactthatthepeoplewereoriginalyviewedasthebodythatdelegatedpowers
tothefederalgovernmenthasimportantimplicationsforunderstandingwhoholds
residuarysovereignty. Sinceitwasthepeoplewhodelegatedcertainpowerstoboth
thestateandfederalgovernmentsinthefirstplace, itisthepeoplewhoretainallun-
delegated powers. This challenges the states rights idea that all plenary powers not
delegatedtothefederalgovernmentresideinthestategovernments. Infact, onlythe
powersthatthepeoplehaddelegatedtoand left with state governments were reserved
to the states through the Tenth Amendment. The remainder of sovereignty stayed
where it startedwith the people.
II. GOVERNMENT AS AGENTS
The concept of the people as sovereigns was preposterous, to many steeped in
British legal thought, who viewed this new model as the repudiation and breakdown
of al governmental order.135 How could the supreme, absolute, indivisible, sovereign
power necessary in every form of government reside in the people when the people
werenotabletoexercisethispoweronaday-to-daybasis?136 Theanswercamethrough
theuseofagencylaw: namely, governmentswerecreatedasagentsofpeopleand
were entrusted with a limited portion of the peoples sovereign power.137
Thereismuchhistoricevidencetosupporttheideathatthepowerwieldedbygov-
ernmentswasbothdelegatedtothem bythepeopleandwasmerelyaportionofthe
peoples sovereign power. Whig leaders inthe1770sassertedthat Political power
132 Id. at 47071.
133 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
134 Id. at326 (emphasisadded);see also N. RiverSteamboatCo. v. Livingston, 1 Hopk.
Ch. 149, 159 (N.Y. Ch. 1824) (The national government . . . was not carved out of existing
statesovereignties;itwastheoffspringofthe peoples choice, coming direct from them.).
135 WOOD, supra note38, at383. Somecriticsdescribedthisnew modelofgovernment
as both arrogant and imprudent. Id. at379.
136 Id. at370, 373, 382.
137 Amar, supra note 30, at 143235 ([T]he very notion of sovereignty as then understood
inBritainsuggestedthatsovereigntywasunlimited. How, then, couldthepowerofcolonial
governmentsbelegalylimitedifthesovereignwasbydefinitionabovethelaw? Theultimate
Americananswer, inpart, layinaradicalredefinitionofgovernmental sovereignty. Just
asacorporationcouldbedelegatedlimitedsovereignprivilegesbytheKing-in-Parliament,
sogovernmentscouldbedelegatedlimitedpowerstogovern. Withinthelimitationsoftheir
charters, governmentscouldbesovereign, butthatsovereigntycouldbeboundedbytheterms
of the delegation itself.).
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isoftwokinds, oneprincipalandsuperior, theotherderivedandinferior. . . . The
principalsupremepowerispossessedbythepeopleatlarge, thederivedandinferior
power by the servants which they employ.138 Noticethatthesepoliticalspeakersuse
thelanguageofagencylaw, describingthepeopleastheprincipalsandthegovern-
mentasmerelytheirtrusteesorservants. Similarly, SamuelChasedescribedthe
power of the people as the light of the sun, native, original, inherent, and unlimited
by human authority.139 Incontrast, thepowerofgovernmentofficialswasdescribed
as the reflected light of the moon . . . only borrowed, delegated and limited by the
grant of the people.140
Thus, becausethegovernmentisentrustedtousepowerultimatelybelongingto
the people, according to Samuel Chase, government was the trustee[] of the people[,]
accountable to them, and subject to the wil of their principals.141 PatrickHenryof
Virginiasimilarlyexplainedthatsincethepeoplehavedelegatedpowertothegovern-
ment, [t]he governing persons are the servants of the people. The historic under-
standingofthisagencyrelationshipisalsoillustratedthroughsomeoftheproposed
amendmentsstatesmadetothefederalConstitution. Forexample, VirginiaandNorth
Carolina recommended that an amendment be added which said that all power is
naturallyinvestedin, andconsequentlyderivedfrom, thepeople;thatmagistrates,
therefore, are the trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them.142
Inconformitywiththeideathatgovernmentsactedwithentrustedsovereigntyas
agents of the people, some of the early state governments had originally been de-
signed as corporate charters.143 Forexample, the1629 MassachusettsRoyalCharter
138 WOOD, supra note38, at364. AsexplainedbyJusticeStory, whenthecolonistsspoke
of sovereignty, they generally used the word in two different senses: sovereignty in the largest
sense meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power . . . the absolute right to govern;
which power resided in the people; and sovereignty in a far more limited sense, used to
designatesuchpoliticalpowersas, intheactualorganizationoftheparticularstateornation,
aretobeexclusivelyexercisedbycertainpublicfunctionaries, withoutthecontrolofany
superior authority, which power was exercised by the state governments. 1 ELLIOT, supra
note 53, at 6364. Thomas Cooley also confirmed this distinction and explained that [t]he
Americanlegislaturesonlyexerciseacertainportionofthesovereignpower. Thesover-
eigntyisinthepeople;andthelegislatureswhichtheyhavecreatedareonlytodischargeatrust
of which they have been made a depository, but with well-defined restrictions. THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 87 (1868).
139 WOOD, supra note38, at371.
140 Id.
141 Id. at371. SimilartotheprincipleespousedbyChase, Virginia, NorthCarolina, and
Rhode Island all offered an amendment to the federal Constitution which stated that all power
isnaturallyvestedin, andconsequentlyderivedfrom, thepeople;thatmagistrates, therefore,
are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them. 1 ELLIOT, supra note53, at
334;3 ELLIOT, supra note110, at657;4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at243.
142 3 ELLIOT, supra note110, at657;4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at243.
143 Amar, supra note30, at1427 (notingthatgovernmentswereframedaccordingto
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described the newly established state as a company and appointed a Governor
and Deput[y] Governor of the said [c]ompany, as well as assistants, with authority
tomanagetheaffairsofthecompany.144 One scholar noted that this commercial
charter[] was a concession[] of powers bythecrowntoenterpriserswilingtounder-
take the risks of exploration and setlement.145 Thispowerwasgiventothesecorpo-
rateofficers, orpoliticalleaders, toactonbehalfandforthebenefitofthesovereignat
that time, which was England. The royal charter stated that for the better Execuon
[sic]ofourRoyall[sic]PleasureandGraunte[sic]inthisbehalf, Weedoe[sic]. . .
nominate, ordeyne [sic], make, [and] constitute a governor, assistant governor, and
board of assistants to continue in the . . . several Offices . . . in such manner . . .
hereafter declared and appointed.146 Evenlatercrowncharters, suchasthosegiven
toNew York, Maryland, andtheCarolinas, createdgoverningpowerstobeusedon
behalf of the crown and that were incapable of alteration or amendment except by
concession from the grantor, or the crown.147
Oncethesourceofsovereignpower, ortheprincipalintheagencyrelationship,
becamethepeopleandnottheBritishgovernment, thestategovernmentsbecame
agentsofthepeople. Statecharterseventuallycametobeknownasconstitutions,148
and many of the states early constitutional provisions written after the revolution
illustratethisnew agencyrelationshipbetweenthepeopleandthestategovernments.
Virginias provision stated that al power is vested in, and consequently derived from
thepeople;thatMagistrates are their trustees and servants, andatalltimesamenable
to them.149 South Carolinas constitution stated that al free governments are founded
on [the peoples] authority, and are instituted for their peace, safety and happiness.150
Marylands vesting provision stated that all government of right originates from the
people, isfoundedincompactonly, andinstituted solely for the good of the whole.151
corporate charter established by the People of America); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) ([C]orporations, in its largest sense,
hasamoreextensivemeaningthanpeoplegenerallyareawareof. Anybodypolitic(soleor
aggregate) whetheritspowerberestrictedortranscendent, is in this sense a corporation. . . .
Inthisextensivesense, notonlyeachStatesingly, buteventheUnitedStatesmaywithout
impropriety be termed corporations.).
144 FRANCIS THORPE, 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1857 (1909).
145 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 190
(1992).
146 THORPE, supra note144, at1852.
147 BAILYN, supra note145, at191.
148 Amar, supra note30, at1434.
149 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, §2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note56, at680 (emphasisadded).
150 S.C. CONST. of1790, art. IX, §1, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note56, at680 (emphasisadded).
151 MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of1776, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
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Massachusettss constitution stated that Government is instituted for the common
good; for the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people . . . .152 New
Jerseys constitution states, [Government] was by Compact, derived from the People,
andheld for them, for the common Interest of the whole Society . . . .153
The analogy between constitutions and corporate charters has profound impli-
cations.154 Oneimportantimplication, whichhasbeennotedbyscholarslikeAkhil
ReedAmar, isthatgovernmentpowercouldbeexplicitlylimitedbythecharteror
constitution, andanygovernmentactsbeyondtheauthorityofthischarterwereauto-
maticalyvoidforlackofauthority. AsdescribedbyAlexanderHamilton:
everyactofadelegatedauthority, contrarytothetenorofthe
commissionunderwhichitisexercised, isvoid. Nolegislativeact
thereforecontrarytotheConstitution, canbevalid. Todenythis
wouldbetoaffirm thatthedeputyisgreaterthanhisprincipal;
thattheservantisabovehismaster;thattherepresentativesof
thepeoplearesuperiortothepeoplethemselves. . . . [T]he
Constitutionoughttobepreferredtothestatute, the intention of
the people to the intention of their agents.155
Thoughtheideaofexpresslylimitinggovernmentactionisacommonplaceone
inmodernAmericanconstitutionallaw, asexplainedbyJamesWilson, thiswasasig-
nificant political advancement in government framework. The idea of a constitution,
limitingandsuperintendingtheoperationsoflegislativeauthority, seemsnottohave
beenaccuratelyunderstoodinBritain. Thereare, atleast, notracesofpracticeconform-
abletosuchaprinciple. TheBritishConstitutionisjustwhattheBritishParliament
pleases.156 In contrast, [t]o control the power and conduct of the legislature, by an
overrulingconstitution, wasanimprovementinthescienceandpracticeofgovern-
mentreservedtotheAmericanstates. . . . [I]nourgovernments. . . ourconstitutions
are superior to our legislatures.157
Further, manyearlyconstitutionalprovisionsillustratethatthepeopleretained
thepowertochangetheexplicitcontoursoftheiragencyrelationshipwiththegov-
ernmenttobettermeettheirneeds.158 As James Wilson explained, the right of the
OF RIGHTS, supra note56, at676 (emphasisadded).
152 MASS. CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note56, at677.
153 N.J. CONST. of1776, preamble, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note56, at678 (emphasisadded).
154 Amar, supra note 30, at 143334.
155 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 29394 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
156 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at432.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
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people[to]changetheconstitutionswheneverandhowevertheyplease. . . isaright
of which no positive institution can ever deprive them.159
A secondimplicationofthecorporatecharteranalogy, largelyunexploredby
scholars, isthatthepositionofgovernmentofficialsastrusteesandservantsofthe
peoplecreatesafiduciarydutyunderthecommonlaw betweenpeopleandgovern-
ment. Thecommonlaw atthetimedictatedthatahighstandardofconductwasre-
quiredofthefiduciary, ortrustee, inthatthefiduciaryhadadutyofcare, honesty,
loyalty, andaresponsibilitytoactinthebestinterestoftheprincipal.160 Scholarshave
noted that this high standard of care had a type of moral element that was prevalent
in the courts enforcement of fiduciary duties.161 Indeed, in Justice Storys treatise, he
asserted that Courts of Equity will enforce fiduciary obligations in aid of general
public policy.162
Notably, thishighstandardofcarewasrequiredofagentswithoutanywritenor
formalagreement;itwasinherentinthefiduciaryrelationship. Further, thefiduciary
relationshipitselfdoesnotrequireaformalwrittenagreement. Insituationswherean
agent was given a confidence from the principal to act on his behalf, the fiduciary
character between the parties is naturally create[d].163 Interestingly, JusticeStory
noted that courts would only interfere to enforce such a high moral standard in such
conflicts as arise from some peculiar confidential or fiduciary relation between the
parties. Story pointed out that were it not for the fiduciary relationship, courts would
either abstain wholy from granting relief, or would grant it in a very modified and
abstemious manner. This illustrates first that courts would guard the fiduciary rela-
RIGHTS, supra note56, at677;PA. CONST. of1776, pmbl., reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note56, at678.
159 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at432.
160 Forexample, undertheEnglishcommonlaw inthecaseofKeech v. Sandford, 2 Eq.
Cas. Abr. 741 (1726), [w]henever a person clothed with a fiduciary or quasi fiduciary character
orpositiongainssomepersonaladvantagebyavailinghimselfofsuchcharacterorposition, a
constructivetrustisraisedbycourtsofequity, suchpersonbecomesaconstructivetrustee, and
the advantage gained must be held by him for the benefit of his cestui que trust. FREDERICK
THOMAS WHITE & OWEN DAMES TUDOR, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN EQUITY 695
(1897). ThisprinciplewascarriedforwardtoAmericancommonlawinthecaseofMichoud
v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 555 (1846), inwhichtheCourtcitedEnglishcommonlawand
held that [t]he general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing
ourselvesinrelationswhichordinarilyexciteaconflictbetweenself-interestandintegrity. It
restrainsall agents, public and private . . . . (emphasis added).
161 JosephF. Johnston, Natural Law and Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers, 8 J.
MARKETS &MORALITY 27, 31 (2005);see also Curtis, supra note 22, at 6 (The Constitution
isasetofbasicinstructionsfrom thepeopletotheiragentsinthejudicial, legislativeandexec-
utivebranches. Inthelaw ofagency, whenspecificinstructionsconflictwithgeneralpur-
posesoftheemployerorprincipal, theagentis sometimes expected to follow broader goalsa
reasonable interpretation of what the principal would want, rather than the principals more
specific instructions.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §33 (1958).
162 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §308 (6thed. 1853).
163 Id. §218.
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tionship with especial jealous[y],164 and second, as a condition of an agents ability
tousetheauthoritydelegatedhim byhisagent, courtswouldconstruesubstantive
limitations on the agents ability to act against the interest of the principle. If an agent
exceededthesesubstantivefiduciarylimitations, hisactionswouldbevoidasoutside
thescopeofhisagencyauthority.
Thus, theagencyrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandthepeoplecreatesin-
herent limits on the government officials power, even if not expressly stated in the
agencycharter, orconstitution. Consistentwiththistheory, ThomasCooleydescribed
the American states as wielding the peoples sovereignty, but hedged in on al sides
byimportant limitations. . . .165
III. THE PEOPLE RETAINED SOVEREIGN POWER OVER NATURAL RIGHTS
Under the states rights model of federalism, since the residuary of sovereign power
isreservedtothestates, anyactionofthestatesnotexplicitlyprohibitedbyastateor
thefederalConstitutionisvalid, evenaviolationofunenumeratedfundamentalrights
ofstatecitizens.166 Ifindeedthestateswereultimatesovereigns, thisconclusionwould
besomewhatlogical, sincetherelationshipbetweenthepeopleandthestategovern-
mentswouldbemerelycontractual. Thus, courtswouldlikelyonlyenforceexpress
provisionsofanagreement, anditisatleaststronglydebatablewhetherexpressnatural
rightsprovisionsintheBillofRightsappliedtothestatesasacontractualmatter.167
However, asdiscussedinPartsI andII, thestatesarenottheultimatesovereigns, but
aremerelyfiduciaryagentsofthepeople. Infact, allowingagovernmentbody, like
thestatesorlikeParliament, toholdultimateanduncontrolablesovereigntyevento
thedetrimentofthepeoplewasexactlythepoliticalsystem thatwasrejectedduring
theAmericanRevolution.
Thesignificanceofthisdeparturefrom theconventionalmodeloffederalism is
thatahigherstandardofcarewasrequiredofbothstateandfederalgovernments, and
substantivelimitationsinherentintheiragencyrelationshippreventedgovernmentfrom
violatingnaturalrights. Inessence, thoughtheBilofRightsdidnottechnicallyapply
tostatesintheantebelum era,168 itdoesrepresentthestandardofcarethatisowedby
legitimategovernmentsasfiduciariesoftheircitizens.169 Thus, powertoarbitrarilyin-
164 Id.
165 COOLEY, supra note138, at85 (emphasisadded).
166 See supra notes 2629 and accompanying text.
167 Caplan, supra note31;KurtT. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth
Amendment, IOWA L. REV. 801 (2008);see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
123 (1998);JasonMazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN L. REV. 1
(2007). But see 2 WILLIAM WINDSOR CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1069 (1980) (arguingthatatleasttheportionsoftheBill
ofRightswritteninpassivevoicemayhavebeenintendedtoapplyagainstthestates).
168 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 24749 (1833).
169 See infra Parts III.AC.
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fringeonnaturalrightswasasovereignpowerretainedbythepeople, andgovernment
actionsofthisnaturearevoidwithoutexpressauthority. Evidenceofthistheoryis
illustratedbelow byexaminingthefiduciaryrelationshipbetweengovernmentand
thepeopleinthecontextofnaturalrights, theFramersunderstandingofunenumer-
atedlimitationsongovernment, andtheprotectionofunenumeratedrightsbyante-
bellum courts.
A. Government Fiduciary Duties Prevent Violations of Natural Rights
AsdiscussedinPartII, thepositionofgovernmentofficialsastrusteesandservants
ofthepeoplecreatedsubstantivelimitationsonvalidgovernmentaction. Onetype
oflimitationarisingfrom thisfiduciaryagencywastheinabilityofthegovernment
to arbitrarily infringe on the natural rights of the people. John Locke wrote, [T]he leg-
islativeactsagainstthetrust reposedinthem whentheyendeavortoinvadetheprop-
ertyofthesubject, andtomakethemselves, oranypartofthecommunity, mastersor
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.170 Similarly, Justice
StoryexplainedthatwhileinEngland, itwouldhavebeenlegalforParliamenttoin-
fringe on individual rights since an act of Parliament . . . is absolute and omnipotent
and that [t]he judiciaryisboundtocarryitintoeffectateveryhazard, even though it
should subvert private rights and public liberty.171 ButinAmerica, wherethepeople
aresovereignandthegovernmentactsastheirfiduciaryagent, suchanacthasnolegal
validity. Storyexplained:
[S]incetheAmerican[R]evolution, nostategovernmentcanbe
presumedtopossessthetranscendentalsovereigntytotakeaway
vestedrightsofproperty;totakethepropertyofA andtransfer
ittoB byamerelegislativeact. Thegovernmentcanscarcelybe
deemedtobefree, wheretherightsofpropertyareleftsolelyde-
pendentuponalegislativebody, withoutanyrestraint.172
Inessence, powertoarbitrarilyinfringeonordenynaturalrightswasoneofthe
manysovereignpowersretainedbythepeople, andthusbothstateandfederalgovern-
mentslackedauthoritytodenytheserights. AsexpressedbyMadison:
[T]herearepowersexercisedbymostothergovernments, which,
intheUnitedStatesarewithheld by the people, bothfrom the
generalgovernmentand from the state governments. Ofthissort
170 IUTISONE SALEVAO,RULE OF LAW,LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE &DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PACIFIC 76 (2005) (emphasisadded).
171 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1614
(5thed. 1891) (emphasisadded).
172 Id. §1399.
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aremanyofthepowersprohibitedbytheDeclarationsofright
prefixedtotheConstitutions, orbytheclausesintheConstitu-
tions, inthenatureofsuchDeclarations.173
Similarly, Wilson described a bill of rights as an enumeration of the powers
reserved.174 Itissignificantthatbothofthesefoundersequatenaturalrightslimi-
tationsongovernmentwithpowersretainedbythepeople. Itisalsoimportantthat
whilebothfoundersrecognizethatareservationofpowerovernaturalrightscouldbe
madeexplicitthroughaninstrumentlikeaBillofRights, bothfoundersinthiscon-
textwereactuallyarguingthatawrittenbillofrightswasunnecessary, asthiswas
presumedtobeapowerretainedbythepeople.175
Thisrecognitionofunenumeratedlimitationsongovernmentisconsistentwiththe
theoryofafiduciaryrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandthepeople. Asnoted
byJusticeStory, iftherelationshipbetweentheAmericanpeopleandgovernment
weremerelyacontractualrelationship, similartoEngland, thencourtswouldenforce
onlytheexplicittermsoftheagreement, orconstitution.176 However, sincethegov-
ernmentactsasafiduciaryofthepeople, entrustedwiththepeoplepower, thisgives
risetothehighstandardofcarerequiredoffiduciaries, inwhichcourtswillconstrue
inherent limitations on the governments ability to act against the best interest of the
peopleunlessthissovereignpowerhasbeenexplicitlydelegatedbypeople.177
Thus, as described by Wilson, a government action beyond the boundsassigned
to it, either explicit in the agreement or inherent in the relationship, must be found by
the court as void for lack of authority.178 Maclainesimilarlysaidthatifthegovern-
ment made a law that infringed on certain rights which never can, nor ought to, be
given up, then under theConstitutionthegovernment would have no authority to
make [that] law. There are limits beyond which [legislation] cannot go.179 Therefore,
thereservedsovereignpowerofthepeopleovernaturalrightscreatedanunenumer-
atedsubstantivelimitonvalidgovernmentaction. As discussed in Parts III.BC, evi-
dencesuggeststhatboththeFramersoftheConstitutionandearlyantebellum courts
understoodthesesubstantivelimitstoapplybothtofederalandstategovernments.
173 JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (JAN. 7, 1800), in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 608, 628 (JackN. Rakoveed., 1999) (emphasisadded). Similarly, as
statedbytheContinentalCongressof1774 intheDeclarationofRights, theinhabitantsof
the English colonies are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and that they have never ceded
any sovereign Power whatever right to dispose of either without their consent. CURTIS, supra
note29, at77.
174 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at436 (emphasisadded).
175 Wilson stated, [t]o every suggestion concerning a bill of rights, the citizens of the
United States may always say, we reserve the right to do what we please. Id. at437.
176 STORY, supra note 162, at 22425, §§ 218, 308.
177 Id. at304.
178 2 ELLIOT, supra note46, at446.
179 4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at161.
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B. Constitutional Framers Viewed Natural Rights Protections as a Limitation on
Both State Governments and the Federal Government
Duringthedebatesatthefederalconstitutionalconvention, itistelingthatmany
ofthediscussionsabouttheprotectionofindividualrightswerenotspecifictothefed-
eralgovernment, butinfactappliedtoallformsofgovernment.180 JamesWilson, a
defender of the federal Constitution said, Government, inmyhumbleopinion, should
beformedtosecureandtoenlargetheexerciseofthenaturalrightsofitsmembers;
andevery government, whichhasnotthisinview, asitsprincipalobject, isnotagov-
ernment of the legitimate kind.181 RogerSherman, arepresentativefrom Connecticut,
proposedanamendmentwhichdescribedthenaturalrightsretainedbythepeople
whentheyenterintoanytypeofsociety, regardlessofwhetherthissociety, orgov-
ernment, isstateorfederal.
Thepeoplehavecertainnaturalrightswhichareretainedbythem
whentheyenterintoSociety, SucharetherightsofConscience
in mattersofreligion;ofacquiringpropertyandofpursuing
happiness& Safety;ofSpeaking, writingandpublishingtheir
Sentimentswithdecencyandfreedom;ofpeaceablyassembling
toconsulttheircommongood, andofapplyingtoGovernmentby
petitionorremonstranceforredressofgrievances.182
Inaddition, MadisonexplainedthatsomeoftheamendmentsintheBilofRightsem-
bodied those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be
exercised by the legislature.183 Notably, Madisonreferstorightsretainedbythe
180 I am indebtedtoRandyBarnettformanyofthehistoricexamplesusedinthissection.
Though Barnett and I use this evidence for different purposeshe to argue that the Ninth
Amendmentwasmeanttocreateaprotectionofindividualrights, andI toarguethatthepeople
had retained natural rights as a limit against both state and federal governmentsmuch of
the evidence presented in Barnetts article was useful for supporting both points. See generally
RandyE. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006).
181 2 JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in THEWORKS OFJAMES WILSON
592 (RobertGreenMcCloskeyed., 1967) (emphasisadded).
182 RogerSherman, Draft of the Bill of Rights, in1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE
351, 351 (RandyE. Barnetted., 1989) (emphasisadded).
183 JAMES MADISON, SPEECH IN CONGRESS PROPOSING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
(JUNE 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 437, 445 (JackN. Rakoveed., 1999). Madison
also criticized governmentsspecifically state governmentsthat did not adequately protect
naturalrights. See GazetteoftheUnitedStates(Phila.), June10, 1789, reprinted in 11
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: 4 MAR. 17893 MAR. 1791, at808, 824 (CharleneBangsBickfordetal. eds.,
1992) (It has been observed, that the ConstitutiondoesnotrepealtheStatebillsofrights;
to this it may be replied, that some of the States are without anyand that articles contained
inthosethathavethem, areveryimproper, andinfringeupontherightsofhumannature, in
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peoplewhenevertheygivepowertoany legislature, notjusttothefederallegisla-
ture. Thisillustratesthetypeofprotectionowedtothesovereignpeoplebyanyform
ofgovernment.
Oneparticularprotectionofnaturalrightsthatillustratesalimitationbothon
federalandstategovernmentsistheNinthAmendment. ThepurposeoftheNinth
Amendmenthasbeenhotlydebated,184 butsomescholarsarguethatitspurposewas
tocreatearuleofconstructionthatwasintendedtogiveindividualunenumeratedrights
thesameprotectionsasenumeratedrights.185 ThisreadingoftheNinthAmendment
comesfromunderstandingtheproblemthatitwasintendedtosolve. Oneoftheprimary
objectionstotheConstitutionmadebyitsopponentsduringtheratificationdebates
wasthattheabsenceofabillofrightswouldallow thefederalgovernmenttoviolate
individualrights.186 TheFederalistshadtwocounterarguments.187 First, thattheBill
ofRightswasunnecessarybecausetheConstitutiongavethefederalgovernmentonly
limitedandenumeratedpowers, andthefederalgovernmenthadnotbeengivenpower
toviolateindividualrights. Thiswasnotsomethingthatthegovernmenthadthepower
todo.188 Second, theyarguedthattheBillofRightswouldbedangeroussinceitwould
beimpossibletoenumerateallnaturalrights, andtheenumerationofsomewould
imply that unenumerated rights had been surrendered.189
While the Federalists arguments certainly entailed a certain degree of rhetorical
and political maneuvering, it is significant that the Federalists first argumentthat
severalrespects. . . . Besidesomestateshavenobillsofrights, thereareothersprovided
withverydefectiveones, andthereareotherswhosebillsofrightsarenotonlydefective, but
absolutelyimproper;insteadofsecuringsomeinthefullextentwhichrepublicanprinciples
would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.).
184 See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States:Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100thCong. 249 (1989)
(statementofRobertH. Bork) (comparingtheNinthAmendmenttowordscoveredbyanink
blot);AMAR, supra note 167, at 120, 12324; Caplan, supra note31;Lash, The Lost Original
Meaningof the Ninth Amendment, supra note 20, at 39499; McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, supra note35, at1222.
185 Barnet, The Ninth Amendment:It Means What it Says, supra note 180, at 14 (It should
bestressedthattheindividualnaturalrightsmodeldoesnotclaim theNinthAmendmentto
be a source of independent rightsor . . . a cornucopia of undefined federal rightsthat
areimmunefrom anygovernmentregulation. First, naturalrightsprecedetheConstitution,
and the Ninth Amendment is not their source. Instead, according to this model, the Ninth
Amendmentreferstothesepreexistingrightsandrequiresthatallnaturalrightsbeprotected
equallynot be disparagedwhether or not they are enumerated.).
186 Id.;see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1999).
187 Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:It Means What it Says, supra note 180, at 78.
188 Id. at7 n.23 (citingTHE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 51314 (AlexanderHamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power
todo? Why, forinstance, shoulditbesaidthatthelibertyofthepressshallnotberestrained,
when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?)).
189 Id. at8.
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thegovernmentcouldnotinfringeonrightsifithadnotbeenexpresslygivenpower
to do sois consistent with the theory that the government could not intrude on the
rightsofitscitizenswithoutexplicitpermission, sincepoweroverfundamentalrights
wasoneoftheresiduarysovereignpowersthatthepeoplereserved. Forexample,
duringthedebateaboutwhethertoincludeabillofrights, RepresentativeTheodore
Sedgwick argued that the right of assembly was a self-evident, unalienable right which
the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in question.190
Representative Egbert Benson replied that [t]he committee who framed this report
[i.e., theBillofRights]proceededontheprinciplethatthese rights belonged to the
people;theyconceived them to be inherent;andalthattheymeanttoprovideagainst
was their being infringed by the Government.191 Notethatbothofthesespeakersagree
thattheBillofRightswasunnecessarytocreatethenaturalrightsofthepeople, be-
causetheyareunalienablerightspossessedbythepeople. Therepresentativesmerely
disagreeonwhethertheBillofRightswouldbeusefulasanaddedcautiontopre-
ventthegovernmentfrom infringingontheserights.
The second argument that the federalists madethat any enumeration of rights
would devalue unenumerated rightsalso supports the idea of powers reserved to the
people. James Wilson said that [a] bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enu-
merationofthepowers reserved.192 Wilson was concerned that an an imperfect enu-
merationwouldthrow allimpliedpowerintothescaleofthegovernment;andthe
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.193 CharlesPinckney, arepresen-
tativefrom SouthCarolina, expressedsimilarconcernsasWilsonandexplainedthat
his state had chosen to have no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution so as not
to even create the impression that the people had delegated to the general government
a power to take away such of our rights as we had not enumerated.194 Thefirstthing
thatisimportanttonoticeaboutthesespeakersisthatbothWilsonandPinckneyac-
knowledgethatabillofrightsdoesnotcreatenaturalrights, itmerelyenumerates, or
lists, powersthatthepeoplehadreservedtothemselvesandnevergiventothegovern-
ment. Bothareconcernedthatanyenumerationofrightsmightnotadequatelyrepre-
sentthevastretainedrightsofthepeople. Noticealsothatbothspeakersrefertoabill
ofrightsinageneralsense, ratherthanasaspecificnationalterm, andindeedPinckney
isspecificallyspeakingofastatebilofrights. Thisisstrongevidencethattheconsti-
tutionalFramersdidnotthinkthattherightsenumeratedinthefederalBillofRights
190 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 731 (1789) (JosephGalesed., 1834) (statementofRep. Sedgwick,
Aug. 15, 1789).
191 Id. at 73132 (statement of Rep. Benson) (emphasis added).
192 ThePennsylvaniaConvention(Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 378, 388 (MerrillJensened., 1976) (remarksof
JamesWilson) (emphasisadded).
193 Id.
194 CharlesPinckney, Pinckney:Speech in South Carolina House of Representatives, in
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at255 (MaxFarranded., 1911).
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weremerelyalimitationonfederalgovernment. Rather, theserightswereapower
thatthepeoplehadretainedfrom allformsoffreerepublicangovernments.
Inresponsetothesearguments, theAnti-Federalistsarguedfirstthattheenumera-
tionofpowersmaynotbeaneffectivelimitationonthefederalgovernmentgiventhe
necessary and proper clause; and second, that the Constitution already enumerated
somerightsinArticleI, Section9, suchasthewritofhabeascorpus, andthusthethreat
ofenumeratingsomerightshadalreadybeenrealized.195 Onethingtonoteaboutthese
argumentsisthattheAnti-Federalistsweremoreinterestedindefeatingratificationof
theConstitutionthaninactuallysucceedinginobtainingabilofrights.196 Nevertheless,
toappeasetheAnti-Federalists, thesupportersoftheConstitutionpledgedtocreatea
Bill of Rights after the Constitutions creation.197
Thus, intheFirstCongress, Madisongavehisfamousspeechinwhichhepro-
posedalistofamendmentsoutliningcertainrightstobeprotected. Attheendofthis
listwasaparagraphthateventuallybecametheNinthAmendment. Itstated:
Theexceptionshereorelsewhereintheconstitution, madeinfavor
ofparticularrights, shallnotbesoconstruedastodiminishthejust
importanceofotherrightsretained by the people;orastoenlarge
thepowersdelegatedbytheconstitution;buteitherasactuallimita-
tionsofsuchpowers, orasinsertedmerely for greater caution.198
Boththisversion, aswellasthefinalversionoftheNinthAmendment, includethe
phrase retained by the people, which powerfully suggests that the government had
neverbeengrantedpoweroversuchrights. Unlesspoweroverindividualfundamental
rightshasbeenexpresslydelegated,199 it is retained by the people as a residual sov-
ereignpower. ThisreadingissupportedbyMadisons view that the Bill of Rights was
inserted merely for greater caution. Consistent with the first argument made by the
Federalists, sincethepeoplehadnevergiventhegovernmentpoweroverthesefunda-
mentalrights, itwasmerelyaredundantcautiontoremindthegovernmentthatitstill
didnothavepowerovertheserights.
SomeleadingcommentatorshavearguedthattheNinthAmendmentinthefederal
BilofRightswasmerelyaprotectionofstaterights, asopposedtonaturalindividual
rights. RussellCaplan, oneoftheearlyscholarstoanalyzetheNinthAmendment,
argued that the other rights referenced in the Ninth Amendment referred only to
rightscreatedunderstatelaw, whichstateshadthepowertomodifyoreliminate.200
195 Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:It Means What it Says, supra note180, at8.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 JAMES MADISON, SPEECH IN CONGRESS PROPOSING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
(JUNE 8, 1789), supra note183, at437, 445 (emphasisadded).
199 Andeveniftheserightswereexpresslydelegated, aswillbediscussedinthesubsequent
section, suchadelegationwasviewedasinvalidforfuturegenerations.
200 Caplan, supra note 31, at 25960.
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AccordingtoCaplan, thepurposeoftheNinthAmendmentwastopreventstate
law rightsfrom beingsupplanted.201 Similarly, KurtLashhasarguedthattheNinth
Amendment was understood primarily as a guardian of the retained right to local
self-government.202 Thus, [a]ll powers, jurisdiction, and rights not delegated to the
federal government were to be retained by the states.203 Lashalsoarguesthatthere-
tainedrightsofthepeoplearereallythesamethingastheretainedrightsofthesev-
eralstates.204
However, thefactthattwelveoutofthirty-threestatesintheantebelum eralegisla-
tivelyadoptedconstitutionalprovisionssimilartotheNinthAmendment, andtwostates
judiciallyadoptedtheprinciplesimilartothatembodiedbytheNinthAmendment,205
isstrongevidencethattheNinthAmendmentwasnotmerelyalimitationonthefed-
eralgovernment, butwasinfactanembodimentofaprinciplethatallgovernments
were limited in their ability to infringe on individuals natural rights.206 Thisisstrong
evidencethatintheantebellum eraitwasunderstoodthatbothstateandfederalgov-
ernmentsmustrespectunenumeratednaturalrightsretainedbythepeopleastheulti-
matesovereign. Furthermore, thefactthatstateconstitutionalprovisionsusedalmost
identicallanguageastheNinthAmendmenttolimitstategovernmentpoweroverthe
201 Id. at 26064.
202 Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, supra note167, at801;
see also AMAR, supra note 167, at 123 (In particular, the Ninth [Amendment] warns readers
nottoinferfrom themereenumerationofarightintheBillofRightsthatimplicitfederal
power in fact exists in a given domain.).
203 Lash, The Lost Original Meaningof the Ninth Amendment, supra note20, at358.
204 Id. at394.
205 Peoplev. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328 (N.Y. 1835);McClenaghanv. McClenaghan, 20
S.C. Eq. (1 Strob. Eq.) 295, 31617 (1847).
206 See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 30 (This enumeration of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people . . . .); ARK. CONST. of1836,
art. II, § 24 (This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people . . . .); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 21 (This enumeration of rights
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.); IOWACONST. of1846,
art. II, § 25 (This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained
by the people.); KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 20 (This enumeration of rights shall
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people . . . .); ME. CONST. of1820,
art. I, § 24 (The enumeration of certain rights shall not impair nor deny others retained by the
people.); MD. CONST. of 1850, Declaration of Rights, art. 42 (This enumeration of rights
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.); MINN. CONST. of
1857, art. 1, § 16 (The enumeration of rights in this Constitution, shall not be construed to
deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people.); N.J. CONST. of1844, art. I,
§ 19 (This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people.); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 20 (This enumeration of rights shall
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people . . . .); OR. CONST. of1857,
art. 1, § 34 (This enumeration of rights, and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the people.); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 23 (The enumeration of the
foregoing rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.).
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people contradicts any notion that states stood as proxies for the people and the
Ninth Amendment was merely protecting states sovereign rights.
If one generation of the people did expressly delegate powers to the government
tointrudeonfundamentalrights, thisdelegationwasviewedasimproperforfuture
generations. OneoftheamendmentsproposedbyRogerSherman, arepresentative
from Connecticut at the federal convention, explained [t]hat there are certain natural
rights, ofwhichmen, whentheyform asocialcompact, cannot deprive or divest their
posterity, amongwhicharetheenjoymentoflifeandliberty, withthemeansofac-
quiring, possessing, andprotectingproperty, andpursuingandobtaininghappiness
and safety.207 In addition, Maclaine argued that the people had inherent, . . . unalien-
able, [and] indefeasible title to [natural] rights.208 Someoftheamendmentsproposed
bystatescontainedsimilarlanguage,209 asdidvariousstateconstitutions.210 AsBarnet
explains, those who enter into social compacts cannot deprive or divest their posterity
207 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in
1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: 4 MARCH 17893 MARCH 1791, at160 (LindaGrantDePauw etal. eds., 1972)
(emphasisadded).
208 4 ELLIOT, supra note47, at161.
209 See AmendmentsProposedbytheNew YorkConvention(July26, 1788), reprinted in
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 635 (That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty,
andthepursuitofHappinessareessentialrightswhicheveryGovernmentoughttorespectand
preserve.); Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), reprinted in
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 636 (That there are certain natural rights
ofwhichmen, whentheyform asocialcompactcannotdepriveordivesttheirposterity, among
whicharetheenjoymentoflifeandliberty, withthemeansofacquiring, possessingandpro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.).
210 See MASS. CONST. of1780, pt. 1, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 56, at 637 (A[ll] men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential
andunalienablerights;amongwhichmaybereckonedtherightofenjoyinganddefending
theirlivesandliberties;thatofacquiring, possessing, andprotectingproperty;infine, that
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.); N.H. CONST. of1783, pt. 1, art. II,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 63738 (All men have cer-
tain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among which arethe enjoying and defending life
and libertyacquiring, possessing and protecting propertyand in a word, of seeking and
obtaining happiness.); N.Y. CONST. of1777, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 56, at 638 (We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal;
thattheyareendowedbytheirCreatorwithcertainunalienableRights;thatamongtheseare,
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness . . . .); PA. CONST. of1776, ch. I, art. I, reprinted
in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 639 (T[hat] all men are born equally free
andindependent, andhavecertainnatural, inherentandunalienablerights, amongstwhichare,
theenjoyinganddefendinglifeandliberty, acquiring, possessingandprotectingproperty, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.); VT. CONST. of1777, ch. I, art. I, reprinted
in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 640 (That all Men are born equally free
andindependent, andhavecertainnatural, inherentandunalienableRights, amongstwhichare
theenjoyinganddefendingLifeandLiberty;acquiring, possessingandprotectingProperty,
and pursuing and obtaining Happiness and Safety.).
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ofthesenaturalrightsregardlessofthepowerstheymaydelegatetogovernment. In
sum, they are inalienable.211
C. Antebellum Courts Recognized Implicit Fundamental Right Limitations on
State Governments as Inalienable
Intheantebelum era, itwasnotseenasnecessaryforthepeople, assovereigns, to
explicitlylisttheirrightsinstateconstitutionsinordertopreventthegovernmentfrom
infringingontheserights. AsmentionedinPartII, thiswasseenasaninherentlimita-
tionongovernmentpowerresultingfrom theagencyrelationshipbetweenfreegovern-
mentsandthepeople. Thoughmanystateconstitutionsdidprovideprotectionsof
individuals fundamental rights,212 historicevidencesuggeststhatsuchconstitutional
provisionswereaddedmerelyforcautiontorecognize pre-existingrightsthatgovern-
mentcouldnotinfringeon, butnottocreate theserights. AsJusticeCooleyobserved:
[T]hepeopleoftheAmericanStates, holdingsovereignty in their
own hands, have no occasion to exact pledges for a due obser-
vance of individual rights from any one;buttheaggressiveten-
dencyofpowerissuch, thatinframingtheinstrumentsunder
whichtheirgovernmentsaretobeadministeredbytheiragents,
theyhavedeemeditimportanttorepeat the guaranty, andthereby
adoptitasaprincipleofconstitutionalprotection.213
ChiefJusticeMarshallobservedthatexplicitconstitutionalprovisionsareonly
one type of limitation on government. The first limitation comes from a republican
government[]inwhichtheresiduary powers of sovereignty, notgrantedspecificaly,
byinevitableimplication, arereserved to the people.214 Similarly, JusticeCooley
211 Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:It Means What it Says, supra note180, at40. This
principleisclearlyembodiedintheDeclarationofIndependencewhich, afterlistingcertain
unalienable rights that all men are endowed with, such as Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness, it explains that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
theseends, itistheRightofthePeopleto alterorto abolish it, and to institutenew
Government . . . . THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). But see
McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights Retained by the
People, supra note 35, at 276 ([T]here were rights which the people oughtalwaystoretain
when entering civil societythose which even the people may not legitimately yield up to
governmentbecausetheyareinalienable. Evenso, theserightsweretobesecuredbythe
writtenConstitution. Andevensuchnaturalandinalienablerightsdidnotholdaninherent
statuswithinthelegalandconstitutionalsystem absentprovisionfortheirsecuritywithinthe
written Constitution.).
212 Foralistofstateconstitutionalprovisionsthatprotectedindividuallibertiesinthe
antebellum era, seeCOOLEY, supra note138, at351 n.2.
213 Id. at351 (emphasisadded).
214 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at383 (emphasisadded).
2014] RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 295
observed that some limitations of legislative authority . . . are prescribed by con-
stitutions, but others spring from the very nature of free government.215
TheSupremeCourtillustratedthisprincipleinWilkinson v. Leland,216 acase
inwhichRhodeIsland, theonlystateintheunionwithoutapost-independence
constitution,217 claimedthatitslegislaturecouldexerciseallofthepowersexercised
bytheBritishParliament. Inthisparticularcase, thepoweratissuewastheability
tovalidateaninvaliddeed. JusticeStory, speakingonbehalfoftheCourt, stated:
Evenifsuchauthority[tovalidateaninvaliddeed]couldbe
deemedtohavebeenconfidedbythecharter[ofCharlesII]to
theGeneralAssemblyofRhodeIsland, asanexerciseoftran-
scendentalsovereigntybefore the Revolution, itcanscarcelybe
imaginedthatthatgreateventcouldhaveleftthepeopleofthat
Statesubjectedtoitsuncontrolledandarbitraryexercise. . . . At
leastnocourtofjusticeinthiscountrywouldbewarrantedinas-
suming that the power to violate and disregard thema power so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty
lurkedunderanygeneralgrantoflegislativeauthority, oroughtto
beimpliedfrom anygeneralexpressionsofthewillofthepeople.
The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital
to their security and wellbeing, without very strongand direct
expressions of such an intention.218
Thiscaseillustratesthatthepeopleretainedtheirsovereignpowersofnatural
rightsevenifdelegationsandlimitationsofpowerwerenotmadeexplicitinastate
constitution. Sincethepresumptionwasthatstatesdidnotreceiveunrestrainedsov-
ereignpower, itwasunderstoodthatcourtsshouldnotconstruethepeopleashaving
215 COOLEY, supra note 138, at 12829.
216 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
217 AtIndependence, RhodeIslandhadnotfeltaneedtoframeanewconstitution, andthus
merelykeptitsexistingcorporatecharterwithminimalchanges. WOOD, supra note38, at276.
218 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 64647 (emphasis added); see also COOLEY, supra note 138, at 165
66 (arguing that Justice Storys reasoning in Wilkinson meant that the power to do certain
unjust and oppressive acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power and that even if
they were, they would be impliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive). A state court
inAlabamacametoasimilarconclusion. Thecourt held that [i]n the United States, certain
politicalrightsareconcededtoberetainedbythepeople, andthepowertointerferewith, orin
anymannertoimpairthem, notdelegatedtoany department of the government. Holmans
Heirsv. BankofNorfolk, 12 Ala. 369, 415 (1847) (emphasisadded);see also Goshenv.
Stonington, 4 Conn. 225 (1822) (With those judges, who assert the omnipotence of the
legislature, inallcases, wheretheconstitutionhasnotinterposedanexplicitrestraint, I can-
notagree. Shouldthereexist. . . acaseofthedirectinfractionofvestedrights. . . I couldnot
avoidconsideringitasaviolation of the societal compact.).
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delegatedthispowerunlessitwasexpresslygiven(asopposedtothepowerbeing
expresslylimited).
Manydecisionsbystatecourtsillustratedawillingnessonthepartofjudgesto
imposenaturalrightlimitationsonthegovernment, evenwherenoexplicitlimitations
werelistedinawrittenstateconstitution.219 Thesejudicialdecisionsarerelevantto
determinethepublicunderstandingofthetypeoffundamentalrightsthatwere
viewedasretainedbythepeople. Itseemsthatmanyoftherightsembodiedinthe
nationalBillofRightswereofthistype.220 Forexample, JusticeLumpkinheldthatthe
Georgia legislatures prohibition on possession of weapons violated the natural221
or unlimited right of the people to keep and bear arms,222 eventhoughtheGeorgia
Constitutioncontainednoexplicitprotectionfortherighttobeararms. Lumpkin
arguedthatthiswasafundamentalrightreservedbythepeopleagainstallgovern-
ments, evenifitwasonlyanexplicitlimitationagainstthefederalgovernments.
Whatadvantagewoulditbetotieupthehandsofthenational
legislature, ifitwereinthepoweroftheStatestodestroythis
bulwarkofdefense? . . . [A]renotthesovereignpeopleofthe
Statecommittedbythispledgetopreservethisrightinviolate?
Wouldtheynotberecreanttothemselves, tofreegovernment,
andfalsetotheirownvow, thusvoluntarilytaken, tosufferthis
righttobequestioned?223
Anotherexamplerelatestotheenforcementbycourtsofdueprocess, evenwith-
outanexplicitprotectioninstateconstitutions. JusticeWarnerrequiredthegovernment
219 ThissectionofmyPaperwillonlyprovideafewexamplesofstatecourtdecisions, but
Jasson Mazzones article on general constitutional law provides an excellent and thorough
surveyofstatecourtdecisionsthatreliedonfundamentalrightsembodiedinthefederalBill
of Rights, even if not listed in the states own constitution. See Mazzone, supra note167.
220 ThefactthatnaturalrightssuchasthoseembodiedinthenationalBillofRightsare
being applied against state governments may initially seem to conflict with the Courts famous
decisioninBarron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), thattheBillofRightswasnot
meanttoapplyagainstthestates. However, MazzonepointsoutthatthisreadingofBarron
actually stood for a much narrower proposition, namely that where the states highest court
hadheldthatastatelawdidnotviolateaprovisionorprincipleoftheFederalBillofRights,
theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwouldnotreversethatdecisionandapplytheBillofRights
to state government. Mazzone, supra note 167, at 16. This was the case because of the Courts
limitedjurisdictionunderthe1789 JudiciaryAct. Id. at218. However, Barron didnotnecessarily
standforthepropositionthatfundamentalrightswereonlylimitsonthefederalgovernment.
ThuswhiletheConstitutionasapositivelaw documentwasonlymeanttoapplyagainstthe
federalgovernment, manyoftherightsembodiedintheConstitutionwereunderstoodtolimit
allformsofgovernment.
221 Nunnv. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 25051.
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tocompensatealandownerforataking, evenwithoutastateconstitutionalduepro-
cessprotection, becauseheviewedthisasanimplicitlimitationonalgovernments.224
WarnerexplainedthatsomeoftheprovisionsinthefederalBillofRights, suchasthis
one, are declaratory of great fundamental principles . . . [a] common law principle,
foundedinnaturaljustice, especially applicable to all republican governments.225
Similarly, JusticeNisbetaffirmedthatdueprocesswasarequirementonboth
stateandfederalgovernments.226 Heexplainedthatifdueprocesswasnotspecifi-
callymentionedinstateconstitutions(asitwasinthefederalBillofRights), that
wasonlybecausethepeoplefeltmoresecureaboutthepowersofthestategovern-
ments, andviewedtheabilityofthefederalgovernmenttoinfringeonrightsasthe
greatermenace.227
[I]twouldbeweakreasoningtosay, thatbecausethepeopleofthe
StateshavedeniedtotheFederalGovernmenttherighttoassume
privatepropertyforpublicusewithoutcompensation, theyhave
therebyconcededittotheStateGovernments. Thecontraryinfer-
enceisirresistible, towit: thatthepeople, feelingprotectedinthe
StatesbythislimitationonthepoweroftheStateGovernments,
wereinducedtomakesureofthesameprotectionfrom theFederal
Government, andthatthe fi[f]th article of the amendments to the
Constitution is to be held and taken as a solemn avowal, by the
people, that a power to take private property, without compensa-
tion, does not belongto any government.228
TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt, sittingindiversity, alsoupheldimplicitlimi-
tationsonstategovernment. InGelpcke v. City of Dubuque,229 theCourtupheldthe
validityofsecuritiesthatwerethoughttohavevestedproperlybeforeacontrarystate
court decision, even though this specific property protection was not listed in the states
224 Youngv. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 45 (1847).
225 Id. at 4344 (emphasis added).
226 Parham v. JusticesofInferiorCourt, 9 Ga. 341, 351 (1851).
227 Id.
228 Id. (emphasisadded);see also Sinnicksonv. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 146 (1839) (explain-
ing that due process is operative as a principle of universal law; and the legislature of this
State, cannomoretakeprivatepropertyforpublicuse, withoutjustcompensation, thanifthis
restraining principle were incorporated into, and made part of its State Constitution); Gardner
v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (This is a necessary qualification
accompanyingtheexerciseoflegislativepower, intakingprivatepropertyforpublicuses;the
limitationisadmitedbythesoundestauthorities, andisadoptedbyaltemperateandcivilized
governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice.); L.C. & C.R.R. Co. v. Chappell,
24 S.C.L. (Rice) 383, 387, 389 (1838) (describing due process as principle of universal law).
229 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
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constitution.230 Thus, thesecasesillustratethateveniflimitationsongovernmentare
notmadeexplicit, therearecertainpowers, suchasnaturalrights, thathavebeen
reservedbythepeopleagainstallformsofgovernmentasaninherentlimitationon
legitimategovernmentpower.
CONCLUSION
ThenewanalysisofhistoricevidenceinthisArticlebringstolightimportantin-
formationabouttheoriginalunderstandingofthesovereignpowerofstates, whichhas
far-reachingimplicationsforunderstandingfederalism. Whilethesystemoffederalism
createdbytheConstitutioncertainlyhasitsuniquebenefits, andwhileitistruethat
statesweredelegatedmorepowersthanthefederalgovernment, thisArticlechallenges
three justifications generaly used in favor of promoting a states rights conception of
federalism: (1) thatitwasthestateswhograntedthefederalgovernmentcertainsov-
ereignpowersandwhoretainultimatesovereignty;(2) thatthereisazero-sum balance
ofpowerbetweenthesetwosovereigns, andanyreductioninfederalpowermustbe
accompaniedbyanenhancementofstatepowers;and(3) thatwhenstatesaregovern-
ingwithintheirsphereofsovereignauthority, theirplenarypolicepowersareonly
limitedbyexplicitstateorfederalconstitutionalprovisions.
Incontrasttotheseproblematicassumptions, thehistoricevidencedemonstrates
thatthepeople, notthestates, grantedsovereignpowerstothefederalgovernment, and
retainedultimatesovereigntythemselves. AftertheAmericanRevolution, thepeople,
notthestates, wereviewedastheultimatesovereignsinthenew republic. Thereare
atleasttwoexamplesthatsupportthishistoricunderstanding. First, theearlystate
constitutionsexpresslyrecognizethatalsovereignpoweroriginatesfrom thepeople,
andthatstategovernmentshadbeenentrustedbythepeoplewithaboundedsovereign
powertobeusedforthebenefitofthepeople. Second, thepeople, andnotthestates,
delegatedpowertothefederalgovernmentbydivertingcertainpowersfrom the
statestothefederalgovernment. Thus, undertheTenthAmendment, anypowersnot
delegatedtothestatesorfederalgovernmentarereservedtothepeople, aspartof
theirresiduaryandunlimitedsovereignty.
Itwasalsounderstoodthatamongtheresiduarypowersthepeoplereserved
againstallgovernmentswerefundamentalrights. BoththeFramersofthefederal
Constitution, aswellasearlyantebellum courtsrecognizedthatthisreservationof
powercreatedasubstantivelimitationonbothstateandfederalgovernments. The
230 Id.;see also Citizens Sav. & Loan Assn v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655
(1874). Thisisalatercase, whichisthereforelesspersuasive, butitstoodforasimilarprin-
cipleasGelpcke. The court stated that [t]here are limitationsofsuchpowerswhichariseout
of the essential nature of all free governments, including [i]mplied reservations of indi-
vidualrights, withoutwhichthesocialcompactcouldnotexist, andwhicharerespectedby
all governments entitled to the name. Id.
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peoplehadretainedpowerovertheirrights, andtherefore, thegovernmentwaspower-
lessbeyondtherealm ofboundedsovereigntyasoriginallydelegatedbythepeople.
Thus, stateswerenotunderstoodtohavepowertoarbitrarilyinvadeonnaturalrights,
limitedonlybyexplicitstateorfederalconstitutionalprovisions.
Itwasalsounderstoodthateveniffundamentalrightswerenotexplicitlypro-
tected in a governments constitution, power over these rights were still reserved to
thepeople, sincethepeopleneednotprotectsomethingthattheynevergaveaway.
Furthermore, even if one generation of the people expressly delegated arbitrary
powerovertheserightstoacertaingovernment, suchdelegationwouldbeinvalidfor
futuregenerationsbecausethiswasaninalienablesovereignpowerofthepeople.
Assuch, federalism wasonlyanothertoolinstitutedtoprotectthefundamentalrights.
Underthisoriginalunderstandingofourconstitutionalframework, argumentsinfavor
of promoting federalism, enhancing states powers, or limiting federal powers must
always be aimed at protecting the residuary powers of Americas true sovereign
thepeople.
